Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads by Fleckner, Andreas M.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 74 Issue 5 Article 2 
2006 
Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads 
Andreas M. Fleckner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2541 (2006). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss5/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads 
Cover Page Footnote 
Fleckner@post.harvard.edu. For very helpful discussions, suggestions, and general critique, I am grateful 
to Howell E. Jackson as well as to Stavros Gkantinis, Apostolos Gkoutzinis, and Noah D. Levin. The 
normal disclaimers apply. An earlier version of this Article has been a discussion paper of the John M. 
Olin Center's Program on Corporate Governance, Working Papers, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
olin_center/corporate_governance/papers.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss5/2 
ARTICLES
STOCK EXCHANGES AT THE CROSSROADS
Andreas M Fleckner*
INTRODUCTION
Nemo iudex in sua causa-No one shall judge his own cause. Ancient
Rome adhered to this principle,' the greatest writers emphasized it, 2 and the
Founding Fathers contemplated it in the early days of the republic: "No
man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would
certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. '3
We might add to this well-known principle another idea: No one shall
judge a competitor's cause. The reasoning is similar: If one passes
judgment on a competitor, it will affect her own position in the competition
and therefore bias her judgment.
When it comes to the future organization of our stock exchanges-the
very heart of our economy-the application of both principles becomes
complicated. As it turns out, we might very soon witness stock exchanges,
empowered by Congress as judges over the securities markets, that are in a
position to judge both their own and their competitors' causes.
With increased competition caused by deregulation, technological
advances, and globalization, the organization of stock exchanges is at a
crossroads. Traditionally, stock exchanges were organized as not-for-profit
organizations, founded and owned by brokers and dealers who managed
* Fleckner@post.harvard.edu. For very helpful discussions, suggestions, and general
critique, I am grateful to Howell E. Jackson as well as to Stavros Gkantinis, Apostolos
Gkoutzinis, and Noah D. Levin. The normal disclaimers apply. An earlier version of this
Article has been a discussion paper of the John M. Olin Center's Program on Corporate
Governance, Working Papers,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/corporategovernance/papers.htm (last
visited Mar. 6, 2005).
1. Code Just. 3.5.0 (Valens, Gratianus & Valentinianus 346) ("ne quis in sua causa
iudicet vel sibi ius dicat"); Code Theod. 2.2.0 ("ne in sua causa quis iudicet"); Dig. 5.1.17
(Ulpian, Ad Edictum 22) ("iniquum est aliquem suae rei iudicem fieri").
2. Johann W. von Goethe, Iphigenie auf Tauris 4.4 (1787) ("auch wir sind nicht
bestellt, uns selbst zu richten"); Lucius A. Seneca, De Beneficiis 2.26.2 ("nemo non
benignus est sui iudex"). The principle has also been referred to in famous legal works. See,
e.g., Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money: And How the Bankers Use It 23 (1914)
("The weakness of human nature prevents men from being good judges of their own
deservings.").
3. The Federalist No. 10, at 50 (James Madison) (J.R. Poole ed., 2005).
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"their" stock exchange like an exclusive club, with high barriers for new
entrants and a regional or even national monopoly, comparable to a
medieval gild. Today, domestic and international competition increasingly
compel stock exchanges to give up their exclusivity, undergo restructuring,
and become publicly traded for-profit companies, a process referred to as
demutualization. 4 At first glance, it might seem incestuous that stock
exchanges themselves issue stock. But in fact this development brings a
kind of normalization: The public corporation-the most efficient
organizational form for large enterprises-will help stock exchanges catch
up with domestic and international competitors.
Notwithstanding these benefits, Congress and the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") should not be indifferent
toward the ongoing transformation, inasmuch as demutualization and the
prospect of bringing stock exchanges public challenge the well-tried
regulatory system that has served this economy over such a long time.
Therefore, well aware of the problems that come with the process of
demutualization, the SEC has put forward amendments to adjust the
regulatory regime to the new organizational reality. 5 In developing these
proposals, the Commission could draw on previous studies by the General
Accounting Office, 6  the International Organization of Securities
Commissions ("IOSCO"), 7 the World Bank, 8 and the Asian Development
Bank. 9 Wisely, however, the Commission so far has moved slowly in
enacting the rules, allowing more time for thorough consideration, a chance
that especially Congress has used to get a picture of the debate. 10
4. The process has sometimes been referred to as "companization." See Ruben Lee,
What Is an Exchange? 35-36 (1998) [hereinafter Lee, What Is an Exchange?]; Ruben Lee,
The Future of Securities Exchanges, in Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 1,
18 (Robert E. Litan & Richard Herring eds., 2002) [hereinafter Lee, The Future of Securities
Exchanges]. In recent years, however, demutualization (or demutualisation) has become the
standard term.
5. Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-50699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126 (Dec. 8, 2004). The comment period was
later extended by six weeks. See Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51019, 70 Fed. Reg. 2,829 (Jan. 18, 2005).
6. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Securities Markets: Competition and Multiple
Regulators Heighten Concerns About Self-Regulation (2002).
7. Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns, Issues Paper on Exchange Demutualization (2001)
[hereinafter IOSCO on Exchange Demutualization]; see also Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns,
Discussion Paper on Stock Exchange Demutualization (2000).
8. John W. Carson, Conflicts of Interests in Self-Regulation: Can Demutualized
Exchanges Successfully Manage Them? (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No.
3183, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-636602. Although the article does,
pursuant to the disclaimer made at its beginning, not necessarily represent the World Bank's
view, the article itself expressly says what the "Bank believes." See, e.g., id. at 1.
9. Demutualization of Stock Exchanges: Problems, Solutions, and Case Studies
(Shamshad Akhtar ed., 2002). This is the most comprehensive work on demutualization,
with contributions from various authors.
10. Regulation NMS and Recent Market Developments: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005); Self-Regulatory
Organizations: Exploring the Need for Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital
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While many observers have early recognized the importance of the
demutualization process, including selected regulatory concerns,"' this
Article offers the first comprehensive discussion of the regulatory
challenges that come with demutualization and listing of stock exchanges,
most importantly the conflicts of interest that arise when stock exchanges
regulate themselves and their competitors.
Part I gives an overview of the stock exchanges' function and
organization. Exchanges are complicated and sophisticated institutions, not
only organizing stock markets but regulating them as well, with the latter
being the main source of the tensions that arise when stock exchanges
themselves become publicly traded.
Part II identifies increasing competition as the main force that drives the
transformation of stock exchanges into for-profit companies. This part
outlines the factors that foster competition, examines the marketplaces that
compete, shows what they compete for, and explains why demutualized and
publicly traded stock exchanges have competitive advantages over
marketplaces organized in the traditional mutual form.
Part III develops the conflicts of interest that arise when stock exchanges
demutualize and go public. Wearing two different hats, those of player and
referee, as stock exchanges do, creates tensions. The main concern
identified herein is not that publicly traded stock exchanges might
systematically under-regulate or overregulate their markets-this would put
in danger the stock exchange's core assets, their integrity and
trustworthiness, and would therefore not be a wise move in the long run.
Rather, the concern is that publicly traded stock exchanges will be too soft
in regulating themselves and too severe in regulating competitors. Even if
we assume that stock exchanges will not deliberately favor their own
interests over others', we should nevertheless be concerned with the
Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial
Services, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Self-Regulatory Organizations: Exploring the
Need for Reform].
11. See Reena Aggarwal, Demutualization and Corporate Governance of Stock
Exchanges, 15 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 105 (2002); Caroline Bradley, Demutualization of
Financial Exchanges: Business as Usual?, 21 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 657 (2001); Roberta S.
Karmel, Demutualization of Exchanges as a Strategy for Capital Market Regulatory Reform,
in Focus on Capital: New Approaches to Developing Latin American Capital Markets 269
(Kenroy Dowers & Pietro Masci eds., 2003); Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares:
Causes and Implications of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 Hastings
L.J. 367 (2002) [hereinafter Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares]; Ruben Lee, Changing
Market Structures, Demutualization and the Future of Securities Trading, in Brookings-
Wharton Papers on Financial Services 283 (Robert E. Litan & Richard Herring eds., 2003);
Lee, The Future of Securities Exchanges, supra note 4; Amir N. Licht, Stock Exchange
Mobility, Unilateral Recognition, and the Privatization of Securities Regulation, 41 Va. J.
Int'l L. 583 (2001); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, From Markets to Venues:
Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 563 (2005); Benn Steil,
Changes in the Ownership and Governance of Securities Exchanges: Causes and
Consequences, in Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, supra note 4, at 61.
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unconscious influences that tend to arise from conflicts of interest.12
William H. Donaldson, the former chairman of the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") and of the SEC, perhaps captured this best when he
noted that, like everyone else, stock exchanges "are not immune from
governance missteps."' 13 But unlike someone else, we might want to add,
missteps by stock exchanges tend not to be limited to certain areas but to
shake the economy as a whole. That is why the governance of stock
exchanges requires more attention than the organization of other
institutions, and probably also more intervention by official authorities such
as Congress and the SEC.
With that in mind, but also adhering to the idea of regulatory restraint,
Part IV puts forward some modest amendments to the current regulatory
structure that would, without greatly diminishing the regulatory powers of
stock exchanges, significantly mitigate the conflicts of interest that come
with demutualization and going public. The proposal is three pronged.
First, the regulatory arm of demutualized stock exchanges should be
separated from the other business units. Second, this separated regulatory
arm should report not to the board of directors of the stock exchange, but
rather to the SEC. Third, self-listed stock exchanges and their affiliates
should be required to have a second listing at another stock exchange.
To simplify matters, this Article addresses only stock markets registered
as national securities exchanges. 14 Similar problems arise when other stock
markets operate for profit and go public (most notably the Nasdaq Stock
Market, before it became itself a national securities exchange). 15
12. The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized this in a slightly different context. See SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 187-92 (1963) (discussing conflicts of
interest of investment advisers).
13. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address at the Open
Meeting Regarding SRO Governance Rule Proposal (Nov. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchll0904whd.htm; see also Siobhan Hughes, SEC
Moves Ahead to Strengthen Governance of US. Stock Markets, Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 2004, at
C3.
14. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000).
15. The Nasdaq Stock Market had filed an application with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") to become a marketplace recognized as a national
securities exchange as early as in March 2001. See The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.; Notice of
Filing of Application for Registration as a National Securities Exchange Under Section 6 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44396, 66 Fed. Reg.
31,952 (June 13, 2001). After years of discussion and numerous amendments, the SEC has
now approved Nasdaq's exchange registration application. See In the Matter of the
Application of the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC for Registration as a National Securities
Exchange; Findings, Opinion, and Order of the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
53128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550 (Jan. 23, 2006); Press Release, Nasdaq, SEC Approves Nasdaq's
Exchange Registration Application (Jan. 16, 2006) available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2006/nesection06_005.stm.
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I. BACKGROUND
Stock exchanges are intermediaries: They bring together sellers and
buyers, investors and issuers, and, through information distribution,
informed and uninformed market participants. Although these are more
constituencies than other financial institutions have, that fact alone would
not call for special attention.
What makes stock exchanges out of the ordinary is that they are both
regulators and regulated entities: regulators insofar as they oversee the
market they organize, and at the same time regulated to the extent that they
are subject to the SEC's control and supervision. The United States
Supreme Court calls this hybrid system a "policy of self-regulation by the
exchanges coupled with oversight by the SEC.' 16
This introductory part identifies the functions that stock exchanges
perform, 17 followed by a discussion of their organizational structure and
how it is influenced by the regulatory regime. 18 The introduction concludes
with an overview of the current organization of the marketplaces for stocks
in the United States, as well as of the most important competitors abroad.' 9
A. Functions of Stock Exchanges
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines an exchange as
[an] organization, association, or group of persons, whether incorporated
or unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a market
place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities
or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions
commonly performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally
understood, and includes the market place and the market facilities
maintained by such exchange. 20
This circular definition helps little either in determining whether a certain
marketplace is a stock exchange 2' or in understanding what functions a
stock exchange actually performs. The circularity of the statutory definition
is not so much a legislative lapse as a nice illustration and inevitable
consequence of the modem stock exchange's complexity. In structuring
their main activities, we might identify stock exchanges as market
16. Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 667 (1975).
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See infra Part I.C.
20. Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (2000). The definition is
further described in 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16 (2005).
21. The question of what constitutes an exchange has been tested in the well-known
dispute between the SEC and the Chicago derivatives markets. See Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 923
F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1991); Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 535-36 (7th Cir. 1989). For a
general overview, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 624-27
(9th ed. 2003). For more details, see Lee, What Is an Exchange?, supra note 4, and Therese
H. Maynard, What Is an "Exchange "?-Proprietary Electronic Securities Trading Systems
and the Statutory Definition of an Exchange, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 833 (1992).
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organizers, 22 as information distributors, 23 as market regulators, 24 as
standards setters, 25 and finally, to an increasing degree, as business
enterprises. 26
1. Market Organizers
The critical function of stock exchanges is to provide a marketplace
where stocks, i.e., shares in the corporation's equity, can be easily bought
and sold. Like other parts of the financial market, stock markets serve the
economy, and by extension the public, in at least three regards: They bring
together those who demand (corporations) and those who supply capital
(investors). They allow investors to reduce their risk by spreading their
investments. And they make those investments liquid enough to invest and
divest without significant price changes. We refer to these functions
collectively as "providing liquidity."' 27 Stock exchanges, by definition,
have always and will always perform this role.
What has changed over the last two centuries is how stock exchanges
organize the trade in stocks, how they operate the facilities where buyers
and sellers can easily come together, agree on prices, and exchange money
for stocks. Until two decades ago, the heart of a stock exchange was its
trading floor, where the so-called floor brokers met, negotiated, and agreed
upon the price for stock transfers, mainly executed for their principals.
But-as will be seen throughout this Article-trading floors have become a
deserted place and an obsolescent trading model. As in many other industry
sectors, humans are increasingly getting replaced by computers, with stock
exchanges maintaining electronic systems that match buy and sell orders
automatically. 28 Not surprisingly, aside from regulatory expenses, stock
exchanges today spend most on information and communication
technology.
2. Information Distributors
Of increasing importance is the stock exchanges' function as distributors
of the information they generate in the price discovery process. Such
information takes two primary forms, and its knowledge is critical from two
main perspectives.
22. See infra Part I.A. 1.
23. See infra Part I.A.2.
24. See infra Part I.A.3.
25. See infra Part I.A.4.
26. See infra Part I.A.5.
27. See Coffee & Seligman, supra note 2 1, at 8-9.
28. The question of whether floor specialists are desirable is far beyond the scope of this
Article. For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to recognize that marketplaces for
stocks worldwide are to an increasing extent organized without floor brokers and that such
marketplaces compete with traditional stock exchanges. For a recent contribution to the
discussion, see Puneet Handa et al., The Economic Value of a Trading Floor: Evidence from
the American Stock Exchange, 77 J. Bus. 331 (2004).
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The first set of information consists of the trades that have been executed,
including the volume, the price, and to some extent the parties involved.
Information of that type has a considerable economic value, 29 as it helps
provide a vast number of financial services, such as furnishing market
reports, analyzing stocks, recommending certain securities for buy and sell,
and so forth. Moreover, information about previous trades is needed for
numerous related business purposes, the most important application being
derivatives, which are financial instruments whose value is derived from an
underlying asset such as stocks.30 For the price discovery of such stock-
based derivatives, it is critical to get the latest stock prices. Aside from
these business purposes, information about settled trades has a paramount
regulatory function, as it is the very basis of market surveillance and helps
detect securities fraud such as insider trading or market manipulation.
The second kind of market data that stock exchanges offer is quotes.
These are prices at which market participants are willing to buy securities
("bid quotes") or sell ("ask quotes"), with the difference being the so-called
spread. To some degree, the knowledge of quotes allows prediction of
future stock prices, making that knowledge very valuable to traders.
Moreover, quotes have a critical regulatory function in the U.S. securities
markets to the extent that broker-dealers are expected to choose the
marketplace with the best available quotes for their clients (known as the
duty of "best execution"). 31
3. Market Regulators
The key function to be addressed in this Article is the stock exchanges'
role as regulators of the market they organize, a mandate that includes all
elements of market regulation, from making rules over compliance
surveillance to enforcement. All market participants and affiliates,
particularly the broker-dealers that trade on the market and the issuers of the
traded shares, are subject to rules that stock exchanges enact particularly for
their marketplace. Moreover, stock exchanges are empowered to monitor
the participants' compliance with the regulatory regime, not only with
respect to their own rules but also with federal and state law and rules
promulgated thereunder, most importantly by the SEC. By doing so, stock
exchanges perform an important role to provide for fair trading and accurate
29. See J. Harold Mulherin et al., Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial
Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J.L. & Econ. 591 (1991). See generally
Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50700, 69 Fed.
Reg. 71,256, 71,270-75 (Dec. 8, 2004).
30. See generally John-Peter Castagnino, Derivatives: The Key Principles 1 (2003);
Simon Firth, Derivatives: Law and Practice 1.004 (2004); Group of Thirty, Derivatives:
Practices and Principles 28 (1993).
31. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.
2001); Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 1998).
For an overview of the duty of best execution, see Coffee & Seligman, supra note 21, at 38,
657-60.
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price discovery, both critical components in fostering investor confidence.
For the case in which someone fails to abide by any of the rules, the stock
exchanges are vested with numerous enforcement powers, from fining
violators to permanently banning them from the marketplace.
The stock exchanges' function as market regulators is-in contrast to
market organization-not innate. There are two main reasons for this
notion. First, it is questionable whether stock markets need be regulated at
all: Other markets operate without any special rules, relying instead
primarily on the traders' caution (caveat emptor) and secondarily on the
common law rules concerning fraud. Second, market regulation, if deemed
necessary, need not be vested in the stock exchanges themselves. Instead, it
might be good, or even better policy to confer this mandate upon someone
other than the market organizer. These issues are far from being clearly
decided. 32  Indeed, some commentators even argue for moves in the
opposite direction, in favor of increasing the stock exchanges' powers to
regulate the market.33
4. Corporate Governance Standards Setters
Stock exchanges regulate their issuers through so-called listing rules, the
most famous of which is the NYSE Listed Company Manual. However, a
considerable number of stock exchange listing rules are more than
regulations providing for fair trading, aiming not at bettering the quality of
trading but at increasing the quality of the traded products: the companies,
the stocks of which are sold and bought. We call such listing rules
"corporate governance rules."'34 Noteworthy examples are rules about
continued disclosure,35 takeover defense,36 stockholder power, 37 the
composition of the issuer's board,38 and the establishment of specific board
32. See Self-Regulatory Organizations: Exploring the Need for Reform, supra note 10;
Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,256; Securities Industry
Association, Reinventing Self-Regulation (Oct. 14, 2003),
http://www.sia.com/marketstructure/html/siawhitepaperfinal.htm; see also Laurie P. Cohen
& Kate Kelly, NYSE Turmoil Poses Question: Can Wall Street Regulate Itsel?., Wall St. J.,
Dec. 31, 2003, at A 1; Aaron Lucchetti, As Exchanges Become Profit-Seekers, Concerns Rise
OverRisk to Investors, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 2005, at Cl.
33. Most noteworthy is Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev.
1453 (1997).
34. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.00-.13 (2006), available at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage-/about/listed/1022221393251.html.
(titling the section as "Corporate Governance Standards"); see also Roberta S. Karmel, The
Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. Rev. 325 (2001). But see
Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards Under
the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. Law. 1461 (1992) (arguing that listing rules further no
purpose of the Securities Exchange Act and are therefore invalid). See generally NYSE,
Inc., supra, §§ 301-15.
35. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., supra note 34, § 203.
36. See, e.g., id. § 308.00.
37. See, e.g., id. § 312.03.
38. See, e.g., id. § 303A.
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committees. 39 Hence, as former SEC chairman William H. Donaldson
observed, in addition to organizing trading, stock exchanges play a "critical
role in our securities markets as standard setters for listed companies." 40
One reason why stock exchanges are so critical in this regard is that their
powers to regulate corporate governance issues reach significantly farther
than the powers of the SEC, as held in the landmark Business Roundtable
case.
41
Corporate governance listing rules are anything but a recent emergence;
the New York Stock Exchange developed such rules no later than in the
mid-nineteenth century. 42 The aim of such rules was, and still is, to
improve the corporate governance of listed companies. Although one can
trade stocks of badly managed companies just as well as the stocks of those
well managed, usually sincere investors are likely to prefer the latter.
Therefore, stock exchanges have a strong incentive to look at the quality of
the products offered on their markets, an insight that will be critical in many
parts of this Article.
5. Business Enterprises
By fulfilling the above-mentioned functions (market organization,
information distribution, market regulation, and standards setting), stock
exchanges carry on a business enterprise. While the business of running an
exchange is not necessarily a commercial (i.e., for-profit) business, it is
definitively a business, and as for every business, those who run it and own
it want to retain and improve its standing. If a stock exchange's
management fails to defend the market share of its exchange or loses issuers
to competing stock exchanges, it can expect to be ousted sooner or later
(likely sooner if the business is for-profit). So, even though stock
exchanges have regulatory powers, they are-irrespective of their actual
organization and their plans to make profit or not-still businesses rather
than governmental bodies or agencies, where the pressure for good
performance is normally much lower.
Like in other business companies, expenses and income matter, and
management tends to focus on cutting the former and increasing the latter.
The main expenses of stock exchanges are in maintaining and regulating the
39. See, e.g., id. § 303A.04 (nominating/corporate governance committee); id.
§ 303A.05 (compensation committee); id. § 303A.06-07 (audit committee).
40. Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-50699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,129 n.30 (Dec. 8, 2004) (citing Letter
from William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to relevant self-regulatory
organizations (March 26, 2003)).
41. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
42. George L. Leffler & Loring C. Farwell, The Stock Market 138-43 (3d ed. 1963). For
the origins of regulation, see Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation:
Cultural and Political Roots, 1690-1860 (1998). For the New York Stock Exchange's
history, see Francis L. Eames, The New York Stock Exchange (1894), and Charles R. Geisst,
Wall Street: A History, From Its Beginnings to the Fall of Enron (2004).
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marketplace (most importantly for the electronic trading system and
regulatory staff), while their income is derived from various sources, the
following being the most common: 43 (1) the issuers of the stocks that are
listed and traded pay listing fees; 44 (2) depending on whether those listing
fees are a flat rate or not, the issuers can also be charged for special
services, such as information distribution during tender offers; (3) fees are
received from the broker-dealers who are allowed to trade at the stock
exchange (known as members or seatholders) and thereby use the stock
exchange's facilities, particularly its trading floor and trading system; (4)
for each transaction, market participants can be charged transaction fees, as
well as fees for clearing, settlement, custodian, and registration services; (5)
stock exchanges can impose fines on regulated persons and entities; (6)
stock exchanges can, and to an increasing extent do, sell market data; (7)
stock exchanges may charge for other ancillary services, such as
information technology solutions and support, product licenses, and so forth
(for example providing floor brokers with hand-held computers, as it
happens at the NYSE). Another field might become general investor
relations services. 45
The funding of stock exchanges raises considerable regulatory concerns.
These worries increase when stock exchanges become for-profit companies,
which dramatically fosters their focus on reducing expenses and enlarging
income. Should Congress and the SEC stay idle when, for instance, stock
exchanges slash their regulatory expenses or, in best opposite, tighten
enforcement and boost their fines, solely in order to make more profit?
B. Organization of Stock Exchanges
The organizational structure of stock exchanges has two notable
landmarks: the Securities Exchange Act of 193446 and the Securities Acts
43. For the stock exchanges' sources of income, see Sebastian Schich & Gert Wehinger,
Prospects for Stock Exchanges, Fin. Market Trends, Oct. 2003, at 91, 100 (providing a graph
showing the allocation between different sources). See generally Concept Release
Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256,
71,270-75 (Dec. 8, 2004); IOSCO on Exchange Demutualization, supra note 7, at 6. The
annual reports of the major stock exchanges provide recent overviews of their incomes. See,
e.g., NYSE, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 24-27 (2004).
44. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., supra note 34, §§ 701.02, 902; see also Jonathan R. Macey &
Maureen O'Hara, The Economics of Stock Exchange Listing Fees and Listing Requirements,
II J. Fin. Intermediation 297, 317 (2002) (closing with the prediction that "either listing
fees, or the exchanges, will not survive"); Schich & Wehinger, supra note 43, at 94
(presenting an overview of the initial and annual listing fees on twenty-four stock exchanges
worldwide).
45. See Press Release, Nasdaq, Nasdaq to Acquire Shareholder.com, Leading Investor
Relations Provider (Jan. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2006/nesection06 003.stm.
46. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (2000)).
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Amendments of 1975. 47 Consequently, the following overview is separated
into three periods: pre-1934,48 1934 to 1975, 49 and post-1975. 50  The
overview will conclude with the recent trend of demutualization, which first
occurred abroad but has now gained ground on U.S. soil as well.51
As a general observation one might note that, although stock exchanges
were at all times at least partly self-regulated, the trend continuously moves
toward centralized federal regulation.
1. Age of Pure Self-Regulation (Until 1934)
The stock exchanges' organizational history differs from that of many
other businesses in the financial sector and elsewhere. Most businesses are
established by entrepreneurs who believe a promising market exists for
their products and services, a demand they can profitably supply.
Businessmen applied for bank charters in communities wherein they saw a
demand for loans; they offered brokerage services, investment funds, and
financial advice in regions and to people they expected would need such
services.
In the earlier days of today's major economies, however, no one set up a
marketplace for stocks, called it stock exchange, and offered the service to
people who wanted to trade. Instead, stock exchanges were established the
opposite way: those who wanted to trade in stocks-brokers and dealers-
looked for a place and system that guaranteed reliable and permanent
trading. As no such organized marketplace yet existed, they launched
one-the birth of stock exchanges. Their intention was not to attract
traders-they were themselves the traders-but to have a convenient forum
to trade securities (with the prospective benefit of commission fees when
they acted for others, or direct profits when acting for their own account).
So unlike many other businesses, stock exchanges were founded by their
customers, 52  and thus were customer controlled from their very
beginning. 53
In this traditional structure, known as the mutual or cooperative form, the
broker-dealers wear three hats: They are (1) the sole or main customers of
the stock exchange; (2) the owners of the stock exchange; and finally, as it
is a closely held entity, they are usually also (3) the managers of the stock
47. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk).
48. See infra Part I.B. 1.
49. See infra Part I.B.2.
50. See infra Part I.B.3.
51. See infra Part I.B.4.
52. We find similar structures only to a limited degree in the history of other branches of
the financial industry, most importantly mutual savings banks and mutual life insurance
companies. See generally Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 246-86 (1996).
53. For the problems of customer-controlled entities, see generally id. For stock
exchanges, see Carmine Di Noia, Customer-Controlled Firms: The Case of Financial
Exchanges, in Capital Markets in the Age of the Euro 173 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2002).
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exchange. This organizational structure had important implications for the
stock exchange's business plan. As the primary customers, the founding
traders were less concerned with the stock exchange making money,
because the profits mainly derive from transaction fees paid by themselves
(from their viewpoint, it is no more than moving money from the own left
into the common right pocket). Thus stock exchanges across the world
were traditionally organized as not-for-profit organizations. The brokers
and dealers that ran the stock exchange did not raise prices higher than
necessary to cover the expenses. 54 Technological advances that reduced the
stock exchange's costs did not lead to increased profits but rather to
decreased transaction fees.
Another remarkable feature of the history of stock exchanges is the
approach to their regulation. Unlike most of the other financial institutions,
namely banks and insurance companies, stock exchanges in the United
States were for a long time nearly unregulated.55  This is surprising
considering their economic importance and monopoly power (at least
regionally due to the difficulty in trading stocks between the East and West
coasts without modem communication). Congress instead relied on the
members of the stock exchanges to ensure that the exchanges and their
markets were well organized (concept of self-regulation), and maybe to a
lesser extent on state laws. Although the stock exchanges' success in
regulating their markets is questionable, they clearly made some effort. 56
2. Inauguration of the Securities and Exchange Commission (1934)
From their inception, stock exchanges have attracted not only good faith
entrepreneurs and investors but also fraudsters, impostors, and swindlers
seeking easy money. This seamier element could be found among all of the
stock exchanges' constituencies: the issuers, the broker-dealers, and the
investors. Stock exchanges, through their self-regulation, have always
responded to such bad participants-much as a golf club does when
members or their patrons damage the clubhouse.
Despite these efforts, eventually the public-and finally Congress-were
no longer content just watching how the stock exchanges handled (and
sometimes tolerated) 57 violations. Proposals to regulate stock exchanges
54. See, e.g., Press Release, ASX, ASX Demutualisation-The First Four Months (Feb.
18, 1999) (Address by Richard Humphry, Managing Dir., Austl. Stock Exch., to CEDA,
Melbourne (Feb. 18, 1999)) (stating that, organized in the mutual form, "some of our
services were substantially underpriced, particularly those directed principally at
stockbrokers"), available at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA180299_AS3.htm.
55. Cf Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 665 (1975) ("The exchanges
remained essentially self-regulating and without significant supervision until the adoption of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.").
56. For an overview of the New York Stock Exchange's ("NYSE's") regulation of their
market, see Mahoney, supra note 33, at 1459-62.
57. See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 351 (1963). The thesis that the stock
exchanges failed to perform their regulatory function is challenged by Mahoney, supra note
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were made as early as the beginning of the twentieth century, but nothing
significant happened.58 Public sentiment dramatically changed with the
crash in 1929, when investors incurred remarkable losses, 59 and during the
subsequent Great Depression. With the belief that the latter was
significantly caused by the crash beforehand, stock exchanges were
increasingly identified as public goods with a critical impact on the overall
economy.
Within a few years, Congress responded; the Securities Exchange Act of
193460 created the independent and nonpartisan SEC as a federal agency to
oversee the securities market and, to a certain degree, the stock exchanges.
The result was a two-tiered system: self-regulation by the stock exchanges
coupled with governmental oversight.6 1  While the stock exchanges'
membership was still restricted, they lost part of their autonomy-formerly
seen as "private clubs," 62 they were now privately organized clubs vested
with public responsibilities.
Nonetheless, the inauguration of the SEC did not change the self-
regulatory system as such. Unlike most other financial institutions, stock
exchanges retained both their status as self-regulatory organizations and
their regulatory powers. That may seem surprising, given both the
tremendous crash and the alleged reluctance of the stock exchanges to
prevent securities fraud. But the tradition of self-regulation, the objections
by market participants against significant changes, doubts as to whether
government could handle the regulation, and changes in political sentiment
helped preserve critical parts of the old system.63
33, at 1464-75. But see Coffee & Seligman, supra note 21, at 2-4 (noting that regulation was
needed for consumer protection, to meet the informational needs of investors, and to cure the
inadequate incentives for disclosure).
58. For a brief overview, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414
U.S. 117, 128 n.9 (1973).
59. A famous note to a 1933 House Report stated that "[f]ully half or $25,000,000,000
worth of securities floated during this period have been proved to be worthless. These cold
figures spell tragedy in the lives of thousands of individuals who invested their life savings,
accumulated after years of effort, in these worthless securities." H.R. Rep. No. 73-152, at 2
(1933).
60. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(kk) (2000).
61. Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 667 (1975); Merrill Lynch, 414
U.S. at 127-28.
62. See William 0. Douglas, Democracy and Finance 65 (James Allen ed., 1940).
63. For some of the identified reasons, see Merrill Lynch, 414 U.S. at 128 n.9. See also
Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50700, 69 Fed.
Reg. 71,256, 71,256 (Dec. 8, 2004). But see Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the
Stock Exchange: Reconciling Self-Regulation and the National Market System, 39 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 1069, 1093 (2005) (stating that self regulation was the "result of historical accident
and political expediency").
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3. Reinvigoration of the Securities and Exchange Commission (1975)
The second legislative landmark is the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975,64 noteworthy in this context for two aspects. First, the amendments
reinvigorated the SEC and gave it substantially more power over the stock
exchanges. Although the exchanges still remained self-regulatory
organizations, they were now subject to extended and tightened oversight
by the SEC, which led to a shift toward governmental regulation as
important as the 1934 establishment of the Commission. In addition, the
amendments imposed new duties on the stock exchanges and strengthened
their corporate governance. With these amendments, the exchanges moved
further from their status as "private clubs" and grew closer to becoming
public agencies. Most remarkably, they were required to submit rule
change proposals for public comment, 65 as federal agencies are required
to.66
Second, the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 established the
controversial National Market System ("NMS").67 This system connects
the various marketplaces that trade stocks in the United States, and is of
critical importance for the allocation of orders and therefore for the
marketplaces' competition.
4. Recent Developments (1993-2006)
In roughly the last decade, the world has seen dramatic changes in the
organizational structure of stock exchanges. While the major marketplaces
in the United States have been unaffected by this development for a long
time, they have very recently started to catch up with global trends.
a. International Trend ofDemutualization (Starting 1993)
Before 1993, all relevant stock exchanges were owned by their members.
Starting with the Stockholmsb6rsen (Stockholm Stock Exchange) in 1993,
stock exchanges worldwide transformed from member-owned companies
into publicly held companies, a development known as demutualization. In
a publicly traded stock exchange, the members are no longer the sole
owners of the exchange. The right to trade at the stock exchange unravels
64. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(kk)).
65. Securities Exchange Act § 23(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(c).
66. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
67. See Donald L. Calvin, The National Market System: A Successful Adventure in
Industry Self-Improvement, 70 Va. L. Rev. 785 (1984); Joel Seligman, The Future of the
National Market System, 10 J. Corp. L. 79 (1984). But see Jonathan R. Macey & David D.
Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 315; Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's
National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 883 (1981).
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from the ownership, and the exchange usually becomes a for-profit
company.
At the 1999 Annual Meeting of the World Federation of Exchanges, 68 as
many as fifteen out of fifty-two exchanges had demutualized, fourteen
exchanges had member approval for demutualization, and another fifteen
were thinking about demutualization, which means that only eight
exchanges were committed to retaining the mutual form. 69  In another
survey in 2003, forty-two out of eighty-five exchanges were demutualized,
sixteen were in the process of demutualization, and twenty-seven had no
plans to demutualize. 70  Eighteen out of the forty-two demutualized
exchanges were listed.71
b. Failed Attempts in the United States (1999/2000)
The United States is relatively late in the process of demutualization, and
it is not completely clear why domestic exchanges have missed that global
trend. Although the legal environment is somewhat hazy, it would probably
not have been impossible for stock exchanges to get around it.
The SEC had occasionally claimed that the Securities Exchange Act
required stock exchanges to have a "traditional membership structure" and
limited "exchange participation to registered broker-dealers. ' 72 Similar
language had emerged from the Supreme Court73 and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, 74 as well as from influential commentators. 75  In
retrospect, such remarks are somewhat surprising because, if they were true,
U.S. stock exchanges could not demutualize without an amendment to the
Securities Exchange Act, or at least an exemption by the SEC. However,
even though the Securities Exchange Act limits membership to registered
68. For general information about the World Federation of Exchanges, see World
Federation of Exchanges, http://www.world-exchanges.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). As
of February 24, 2006, the federation had fifty-seven members. See World Federation of
Exchanges, Members Worldwide, http://www.world-
exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?action=document&menu=54 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006)
69. These numbers were informally reported at the mentioned meeting. See IOSCO on
Exchange Demutualization, supra note 7, at 3.
70. Carson, supra note 8, at 5.
71. Id.
72. Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 34-38672, International Series
Release No. IS-1085, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,485, 30,487 (June 4, 1997).
73. See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 350 (1963) ("The exchanges are by
their nature bodies with a limited number of members, each of which plays a certain role in
the carrying out of an exchange's activities.").
74. Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the Securities
Exchange Act treats exchanges as "organizations created and run by broker-members");
accord Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270, 1272 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that "the statute
requires that an exchange be controlled by its participants, who must in turn be registered
brokers or individuals associated with such brokers").
75. Coffee & Seligman, supra note 21, at 630 ("[T]he 1934 Act mandates a governance
structure for exchanges based on a conception of them as not-for-profit organizations run for
the benefit of participating dealers.").
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broker-dealers, 76 the Act does not, contrary to what the foregoing
authorities might suggest, expressly state that the stock exchange be owned
by its members. It is therefore critical to distinguish between membership,
which carries the right to trade on the stock exchange and to manage it, and
ownership, which gives entitlement to profits and the residual share. The
Securities Exchange Act seems not to require that both occur together.
Another important issue is whether the Securities Exchange Act
presumes that stock exchanges are not-for-profit organizations; the SEC
casually gave the impression that it believed so, 77 as did some observers. 78
However, as early as 1998, in its rule on exchanges and alternative trading
systems (known as Regulation ATS), the Commission (surprisingly,
considering the earlier remarks) stated that it had, under certain conditions,
no objections against demutualized for-profit exchanges. 79
Shortly thereafter, the New York Stock Exchange, at that time described
as "die-hard traditionalists" 80 and as a "potential Titanic,"81 announced
plans to demutualize and go public. 82 In a now well-known testimony,
Richard A. Grasso, then chairman and CEO of the New York Stock
Exchange, praised this plan as "critically needed to assure the continued
competitiveness and position" of the exchange. 83 Arthur Levitt, then-
chairman of the SEC, several times emphasized the importance of
demutualization and warned the domestic stock exchanges not to miss the
international trend of demutualization. 84 However, the demutualization
76. Securities Exchange Act § 6(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(1) (2000).
77. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487 (stating that there are
"exchange requirements that are incompatible with the operation of for-profit, non-
membership alternative trading systems").
78. Coffee & Seligman, supra note 21, at 630.
79. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,848 (Dec. 22, 1998).
80. Richard G. Humphry, Managing Dir., Austl. Stock Exch., The Challenge of
Financial Globalisation: Address to the CEDA Capital Markets Seminar (Aug. 12, 1999),
available at http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA120899_AS3.htm.
81. A Home-Grown Revolutionary, Economist, July 31, 1999, at 60.
82. See Press Release, NYSE, NYSE Appoints Committee on Market Structure,
Governance and Ownership (Oct. 11, 1999), available at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=/press/1044027445373.html [hereinafter
Press Release, NYSE Appoints Committee]; Press Release, NYSE, NYSE Chairman
Richard A. Grasso's Letter to Members Concerning "Demutualization" (Sept. 2, 1999),
available at http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=/press/1044027444806.html;
see also A Home-Grown Revolutionary, supra note 81, at 60; Mike McNamee, Rethinking
Wall Street, Bus. Wk., Oct. 11, 1999, at 146; NYSE Unlikely to Go Public Until 2nd Half of
2001, Wall St. J., May 25, 2000, at 1; Sandra Sugawara, NYSE May Drop Plans to Take
Itself Public, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 2000, at El; Sandra Sugawara, NYSE Must Change, Levitt
Warns, Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1999, at El [hereinafter Sugawara, NYSE Must Change].
83. Public Ownership of Stock Exchanges: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Richard A. Grasso,
Chairman, New York Stock Exchange) [hereinafter Grasso Statement].
84. The Changing Face of Capital Markets and the Impact of ECN's: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th
Cong. (1999) [hereinafter The Changing Face of Capital Markets and the Impact of ECN's]
(statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) (stating that
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plan of the New York Stock Exchange soon failed, due partly, it appears, to
the larger than expected resistance of the members, who wanted to preserve
the traditional structure that had served them so well over a long time, 85 as
well as tax reasons. 86
c. Demutualizations in the United States (2004/2005)
In outsourcing its equity business and establishing PCX Equities, Inc., as
a corporate subsidiary in 1999, the Pacific Exchange created the first
demutualized for-profit marketplace for stocks in the United States. In the
same way, it set up PCX Options, Inc., which demutualized in June 2004.
Finally, the Pacific Exchange itself demutualized in August 2004.87 In
2000, the Pacific Stock Exchange, together with Archipelago Holdings,
created a new national securities exchange, Archipelago Exchange
("ArcaEx"). 88 Eventually, ArcaEx replaced the equity trading arm of the
Pacific Exchange, the above-mentioned PCX Equities, Inc. 89 Archipelago
Holdings went public in 2004.90 In January 2005, Archipelago Holdings,
Inc., announced that, contingent on SEC approval, it "had entered into a
"today's global marketplace always stands ready to offer alternatives that are more
responsive to investor needs"), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/99_IOhrg/I02799/levitt.htm; Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. and
Exch. Comm'n, Dynamic Markets, Timeless Principles, Address at the Columbia School of
Law (Sept. 23, 1999), in 2000 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1; see also Sugawara, NYSE Must
Change, supra note 82 (quoting Levitt saying that "[i]f they [the New York Stock Exchange]
don't change their method of governance, they won't be here five years from now").
85. Mara Der Hovanesian, Put the Big Board on the Big Board, Bus. Wk., Sept. 13,
2004, at 90; Sugawara, NYSE Must Change, supra note 82. The issue is nicely described
(before the demutualization plan failed) in A Home-Grown Revolutionary, supra note 81.
86. Sugawara, NYSE Must Change, supra note 82.
87. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Pacific Exchange, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed
Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment
No. 1 Thereto Relating to the Demutualization of the Pacific Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 34-49718, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,611 (May 24, 2004).
88. See Press Release, Pac. Exch., Archipelago and the Pacific Exchange Announce Plan
to Create a New National Stock Exchange (Mar. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.tradearca.com/content/press/releases 03 14 00.pdf; Press Release, Pac. Exch.,
Archipelago and the Pacific Exchange Close Transaction to Create National Stock Exchange
(July 13, 2000), available at http://www.pacificex.com/news/press/press-
2000/abtpress00arca close.html; Press Release, Pac. Exch., Archipelago Exchange
Approved by SEC (Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://pacificex.com/news/press/press-
2001/abt_press 01 sec arcaex.html.
89. See Press Release, Pac. Exch., Pacific Exchange's San Francisco Equities Floor
Passes into History (Mar. 20, 2002), available at
http://www.pacificex.com/news/press/press-2002/press_4-20-2_close.html; Press Release,
Pac. Exch., PCX Equities Floors Pass into History (Mar. 19, 2001), available at
http://www.pacificex.com/news/press/press-2001/abtpress 01 floors.html.
90. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change
and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 1 to the
Proposed Rule Change by the Pacific Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Certificate of
Incorporation and Bylaws of Archipelago Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-
50170, 69 Fed. Reg. 50,419 (Aug. 16, 2004).
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definitive agreement" to acquire PCX Holdings, Inc., the parent company of
the Pacific Exchange and PCX Equities, Inc.91
The Philadelphia Stock Exchange demutualized in 2004;92 the Chicago
Stock Exchange followed in 2005.93 Neither is publicly traded.
d. New York Stock Exchange-Archipelago Merger (2005/2006)
In the spring of 2005, the New York Stock Exchange made its next, and
this time successful attempt, to demutualize and go public. 94 After five
years of deadlock, the sentiment about demutualization among the
exchange's members, who have to approve the demutualization of "their"
exchange, seemed to have changed. There are at least three events that may
explain the altered attitude: investigations against the exchange and the
specialist firms for securities fraud;95 the corporate governance-related
turmoil in the aftermath of Chairman Grasso's widely noticed ouster; and
the falling prices for seats at the exchange, which dropped by more than
half since their peak in 2000.96
These incidents significantly weakened the exchange's members: Mr.
Grasso, who had spent most of his life at the New York Stock Exchange,
had for a long time been the specialists' guardian angel; with his dismissal
the members lost their closest ally against the electronic trading that makes
floor specialists unnecessary; the fraud investigations, among the largest in
91. Press Release, Pac. Exch., Archipelago Holdings Inc. to Acquire the Pacific
Exchange (Jan. 3, 2005), available at
http://investor.archipelago.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=140290&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=658450
&highlight-; see also Kate Kelly & Gregory Zuckerman, Pacific Surf Archipelago Takes
the Ultimate Options Ride, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 2005, at Cl. For the necessary adjustments,
see Self-Regulatory Organizations; Pacific Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Proposed
Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto Relating to the Certificate of Incorporation of
PCX Holdings, Inc., PCX Rules and Bylaws of Archipelago Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 34-52249, 70 Fed. Reg. 48,611, 48,612 (Aug. 18, 2005).
92. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc.; Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of
Amendment No. 3 Thereto Relating to the Demutualization of the Philadelphia Stock
Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49098, 69 Fed. Reg. 3974 (Jan. 27, 2004).
For an assessment of their chances in the new competitive and regulatory landscape, see
Meyer Frucher, Duopoly Alert!, Wall St. J., June 13, 2005, at A12 (providing the opinion of
the Philadelphia Stock Exchange's Chairman and CEO).
93. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. 1 and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to
Amendment No. 3 by the Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Demutualization of
the Chicago Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-51149, 70 Fed. Reg. 7531 (Feb.
14, 2005).
94. Gaston F. Ceron, Big Board, Pondering Transition to For-Profit, Sets Review Panel,
Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 2005, at C3; see also Gaston F. Ceron & Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE Profit
Dropped 50% Last Year, Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 2005, at C3 (mentioning the appointment of a
committee to consider demutualization); Der Hovanesian, supra note 85; The $1.5 Million
Club: NYSE Seats Rebound, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 2005, at C3 (same); With 3 New Directors
Nominated, NYSE Members Await April Vote, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 2005, at C3 (same).
95. See infra Part III.A.3.
96. See infra Part I.C tbl.2.
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the exchange's history, were the next earthquake; and last but not least,
revenues shrank and many firms ended up in the red.
It was no coincidence, then, and not surprising, that in April 2005 the
New York Stock Exchange, with its members weakened, announced that it
would merge with Archipelago Holdings and subsequently go public. 97
This landmark deal has drawn much public attention. That Archipelago, the
successful start-up marketplace, would finally merge with the old New
York Stock Exchange is something few commentators had expected-as
the following anecdote may illustrate: In early 2005, Archipelago's CEO
spent one week mostly in New York. Analysts asked him whether he had
visited the alternative trading system Instinet, a potential takeover target
(Instinet ultimately was acquired by Nasdaq). 98  His answer: "I was
absolutely not in Instinet. Right hand in the air, Bible in my left." 99 Not
one of the smart analysts who questioned him stopped to consider the
possibility of a merger between Archipelago and the New York Stock
Exchange.
After a long series of steps, l00 most importantly approval by its
members, 10 1 the Justice Department, 102 and the SEC, 103 the new NYSE
Group, Inc., is now a publicly traded stock exchange, operating the New
York Stock Exchange and Archipelago.
97. Press Release, NYSE & Archipelago, New York Stock Exchange and Archipelago
Exchange Agree to Merge (Apr. 20, 2005), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/joint-release.pdf; see also To Tell The Truth, Wall St. J., Apr. 29,
2005, at C4 (mentioning merger); Jerry Putnam, Chairman & CEO, Archipelago Holdings
Inc., Public Statement on Agreement to Merge NYSE and Archipelago (Apr. 20, 2005),
available at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=/content/articles/I 1113993488657.html.
98. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, Nasdaq Chief Plays Hardball In Instinet Deal, Wall St.
J., Apr. 25, 2005, at Cl; Gregory Zuckerman et al., Nasdaq Faces Head-On Assault From
NYSE Deal, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 2005, at Al; Press Release, Nasdaq, Nasdaq Completes
Acquisition of INET (Dec. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2005/nesection05118.stm.
99. To Tell the Truth, supra note 97; see also Craig Karmin, CEO Putnam's Revenge:
NYSE Deal, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 2005, at Cl (mentioning unsuccessful talks in 2001 to
market Archipelago's trading system to the New York Stock Exchange).
100. For an overview of all relevant documents, see the New York Stock Exchange's
Website, http://www.nyse.com/about/newsevents/ 1 14079977834.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
101. See Aaron Lucchetti, A Big Exchange: NYSE Members Approve Deal, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 7, 2005, at Cl.
102. U.S. Approves Exchange Deals, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 2005, at C3.
103. Self-Regulatory Organizations; the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Order Granting
Approval of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 3, and 5 Thereto and Notice
and Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment Nos. 6 and 8 Relating
to the NYSE's Business Combination with Archipelago Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 34-53382, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (Mar. 6, 2006).
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C. Overview of the Current Organizational Structure (2006)
The following tables give an overview of the current organizational
structure of foreign and domestic stock exchanges, as well as the market
value of exchanges whose shares are publicly traded (as of February 17,
2005).
STOCK EXCHANGES AT THE CROSSROADS
Table 1: Foreign Stock Exchanges' 0 4
Stock Exchange Demutualized Listed Market Value
1 Australian Stock Exchange 1998105 1998 $2.5 billion
2 Deutsche B6rse 2000106 2001 $13.3 billion
3 Euronext 1997107 2001 $7.2 billion
4 HK Exchanges and Clearing 200010 2000 $5.3 billion
5 London Stock Exchange 1999 2001 $3.7 billion
6 OMX Group 1993109 1993110 $2.1 billion
7 Tokyo Stock Exchange 2001 -
8 TSX Group 2000111 2001 $2.9 billion
104. This is based on publicly available data. For an overview of twenty-six more or less
important stock exchanges (the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is mentioned but does not list
stocks) that have demutualized, see Schich & Wehinger, supra note 43, at 103. For
exhaustive data on selected exchanges, see Alfredo Mendiola & Maureen O'Hara, Taking
Stock in Stock Markets: The Changing Governance of Exchanges (August 2003)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=431580.
105. See Frank Donnan, Self-regulation and the Demutualisation of the Australian Stock
Exchange, 10 Austl. J. Corp. L. 1 (1999).
106. Deutsche B6rse itself is not an exchange but rather operates an exchange, the
Frankfurter Wertpapierb6rse (Frankfurt Stock Exchange). Neither Frankfurter
Wertpapierbrse nor Deutsche B6rse are demutualized stock exchanges under the normal
definition. Together, however, they look like a demutualized and publicly traded stock
exchange. Because the regulatory powers are vested with the exchange, which is a public
agency under German law, the regulatory challenges that come with demutualization under
U.S. law are less important in Germany (provided that both entities, the operator and the
exchange, are truly separated).
107. Euronext is the result of a merger of the Amsterdam Exchanges (AEX), the Brussels
Exchanges (BXS), the ParisBourseSB S.A., and later the Bolsa des Valores de Lisboa e
Porto (BVLP). See Euronext, History,
http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/0,5371,1732 4427342,00.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2006). The Amsterdam Exchanges (AEX), as a predecessor of today's OMX Group,
demutualized in 1997.
108. The Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited is not an exchange but the parent
company of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. For the demutualization, see Betty M. Ho,
Demutualization of Organized Securities Exchanges in Hong Kong: The Great Leap
Forward, 33 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 283 (2002).
109. OMX Group owns and operates the exchanges of Copenhagen (Denmark), Helsinki
(Finland), Riga (Latvia), Stockholm (Sweden), Tallinn (Estonia), and Vilnius (Lithuania).
The Stockholmsborsen (Stockholm Stock Exchange), as a predecessor of today's OMX
Group, demutualized as early as 1993. The Helsingin Prssi (Helsinki Stock Exchange)
demutualized in 1995; the Kobenhavns Fondsbors (Copenhagen Stock Exchange) in 1996.
110. OMX Group shares themselves have been listed since 2003. The shares of
Stockholmsbirsen (Stockholm Stock Exchange), as a predecessor of today's OMX Group,
were listed in 1993.
111. TSX Group owns and operates the Toronto Stock Exchange and the TSX Venture
Exchange.
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Table 2: Domestic Stock Exchanges
1 American Stock Exchange - - -
2 Archipelago Exchange 2004 2004 $2.8 billion
3 Boston Stock Exchange - - -
4 Chicago Stock Exchange 2005 - -
5 National Stock Exchange - - -
6 New York Stock Exchange 2006 2006 $6.4 billion[l2
-with Archipelago $9.2 billion"13
7 Philadelphia Stock Exchange 2004 - -
8 Nasdaq Stock Market'14 2002 2002 $3.8 billion
112. The New York Stock Exchange is not yet a publicly traded company (as of February
17, 2006). The market value is therefore an estimation. The former seatholders of the New
York Stock Exchange are going to get seventy percent of the new company. See Press
Release, N.Y. Stock Exch. & Archipelago, supra note 97. So the New York Stock
Exchange's value, based on the merger agreement, is Archipelago's present value multiplied
by 7/3. Another way to calculate the New York Stock Exchange's value was to multiply the
number of seats (1366) by the seat price (last trade at $3.55 million, as of December 30,
2005), which totalled $4.8 billion. Neither numbers include extra benefits that the members
will get as part of the merger.
113. This too is an estimation based on Archipelago's current value and the merger
agreement.
114. The Nasdaq Stock Market was not yet registered as a national securities exchange
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at the time that it demutualized and went public.
See supra note 15.
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The following chart compares the U.S. marketplaces (dark) with stock
exchanges abroad (light):
Chart 1: Market Value of the Stock Market Operators
(in Billions of U.S. Dollars)
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Although much could be said about these figures, one particular
comparison shows clearly what is at stake for the United States: Even after
taking into account the merger with Archipelago, the New York Stock
Exchange would have only sixty-nine percent of Deutsche B6rse's market
value. 115 Before the merger announcement, at the seat price's low in
January 2005, the New York Stock Exchange's market value reached only
some ten percent of Deutsche B6rse's current market capitalization." 16
There are many reasons for that discrepancy, most notably that Deutsche
B6rse is a diversified company offering not only trading in stocks and
derivatives but also ancillary services such as clearing (through its
subsidiary Clearstream), whereas the New York Stock Exchange still does
virtually the same thing it has for the last two centuries: organizing a
market solely for stocks.
115. These market values would be $9.2 billion compared to $13.3 billion. See supra
$120 tbl.1, $121 tbl.2.
116. These market values were $1.3 billion (1366 seats multiplied by $975,000, the low
as of January 11, 2005) compared to $13.3 billion. See supra $120 tbl.1. Earlier estimations
for the New York Stock Exchange's market value were even lower. See Der Hovanesian,
supra note 85 ($0.9 billion). Concededly, Deutsche B6rse's market value on January 11,
2005, was considerably lower than today.
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The course of the prices for so-called "seats" at the New York Stock
Exchange nicely illustrates the stormy period that the exchange has faced in
recent history. Before demutualization, those seats conferred the right to
buy and sell stocks at the New York Stock Exchange, both as agent (broker)
and as principal (dealer). There were 1366 of those seats. 117 Trading in
seats ceased on December 30, 2005, after almost 140 years." 1 8 During the
last eight years, the period when electronic trading became commonplace
and most of its rivals demutualized, seats at the New York Stock Exchange
performed according to the following chart. 119 (In the chart each column
stands for a single trade; the time intervals are therefore not equal.)
Chart 2: Trades in Seats on the New York Stock Exchange
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On balance, the trend is clearly toward demutualization. In the short
term, the exempting powers of the SEC may be sufficient to deal with
demutualization. But for purposes of avoiding any kind of ambiguity,
Congress would be well advised to amend the Securities Exchange Act and
adjust it to the new organizational reality. When doing so, it might be
worth looking at the following discussion of the underlying reasons for the
117. See Certificate of Incorporation of NYSE, Inc. § 13.
118. See Gene Colter, NYSE Closes Its Books and Folds up Its Seats to Start New Life as
a For-Profit Exchange, Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 2005, at B3; Aaron Lucchetti, Betting Big on
Big Board's Seats, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 2005, at C1.
119. Seat sales were reported in The Wall Street Journal, usually on the following day, as
well as on the New York Stock Exchange's website.
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demutualization trend, the conflicts of interest that come with it, and the
proposed amendments that might help control them.
II. THE CASE FOR DEMUTUALIZATION AND GOING PUBLIC
Demutualizing and subsequently going public are critical to any stock
market's ability to compete with other marketplaces. While commentators
sometimes identify distinct factors that drive demutualization, in fact they
are all related to one single point: competition. 120 The stock exchanges
themselves regularly emphasize the paramount importance of competition
for their reorganization, among them the New York Stock Exchange, 121 the
Nasdaq Stock Market, 122 the Australian Stock Exchange, 123 and the London
Stock Exchange 124-as well as neutral observers such as the SEC 125 and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions. 126
This part explains which forces drive competition, 127 which markets
compete, 128 what they are competing for, 129 and most importantly, why
120. The stock exchanges' decision to demutualize and go public may also be influenced
by noneconomic reasons, most importantly self-dealing by management, as they will profit
from the higher prestige and compensation that they can earn when leading a for-profit
company. The members of the stock exchange might benefit by exchanging their illiquid
seats for liquid stocks (the latter is a point that Bradley, supra note 11, emphasizes
throughout her article; it is, however, unclear whether the seat on a stock exchange has
enough value to influence the owners' decision to demutualize). These noneconomic factors
are not further discussed, as they seem not to be the driving factor behind the global
demutualization trend.
121. For this emphasis during the latest move to demutualize, see Press Release, N.Y.
Stock Exch. & Archipelago, supra note 97. See also Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Europe May
Offer a Glimpse Into Future of U.S. Exchange, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 2005, at CI (mentioning
that the New York Stock Exchange's CEO stated that global competitors are all publicly
traded companies); The $1.5 Million Club: NYSE Seats Rebound, supra note 94 (mentioning
that members hope that changing to for-profit business would make the New York Stock
Exchange more competitive). For this emphasis during the failed attempt in 1999, see
Grasso Statement, supra note 83, and Press Release, NYSE Appoints Committee, supra note
82.
122. Press Release, Nasdaq, Nasdaq to Eecome a Public Company (Apr. 26, 2001),
available at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroorn/news/pr200 1/ne_section0 1 140.html.
123. Richard Humphry, Managing Dir., Austl. Stock Exch., Address to Association of
Superannuation Funds of Australia, Sydney, ASX Demutualisation: Cause and Effect
Address (December 9, 1998), available at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA091298_AS3.htm.
124. Cf Alan Cowell, Old Exchange In London Tries A New Twist on Ownership, N.Y.
Times, July 31, 1999, at Cl (describing the London Stock Exchange).
125. See Deborah Solomon, Thrill Bill, 2: Donaldson Has Impact Again, Wall St. J.,
May 2, 2005, at Cl (quoting the SEC's Chairman William H. Donaldson in the context of
the merger of the New York Stock Exchange and Archipelago as follows: "If you step back
and look at what is in the process of happening now-the consolidation, the level playing
field-this, I believe, is a prelude to global competition.").
126. IOSCO on Exchange Demutualization, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that "certain
responses to competition, such as alliances and mergers between exchanges, may be
facilitated by demutualization").
127. See infra Part II.A.
128. See infra Part II.B.
129. See infra Part II.C.
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demutualized and publicly traded stock exchanges might have competitive
advantages over exchanges that are organized in the traditional mutual
form.130
A. Factors that Foster Competition
This section outlines the factors that foster competition among
marketplaces for stocks. The critical determinants are deregulation, 13 1
technology, 132 and globalization. 133 All three factors correlate with each
other, but they can be identified as separate forces.
1. Deregulation
Recent years have seen numerous changes in the regulatory system that
helped foster competition in the stock markets. While it is hard to say
whether the intensity of regulation overall has declined, there have been
some critical acts of deregulation. 134 The most important in fostering
competition have been: (1) the end of fixed commissions; 135 (2) new order-
handling rules; 136 (3) Regulation ATS, which should lower the entry
barriers for new competitors; 137 and (4) decimalization, that is, trading in
decimals instead of eighths or sixteenths.138 The most critical influence on
competition in the near future will be the new National Market System. 139
2. Technology
Notwithstanding the regulatory changes, the, main reason that
competition among stock markets has dramatically increased in the past few
years is the astonishing technological progress. 140 New communication and
information technologies are driving the changes in the securities markets,
130. See infra Part lI.D.
131. See infra Part II.A.1.
132. See infra Part II.A.2.
133. See infra Part II.A.3.
134. For an early assessment, see generally Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange:
The Causes andEffects of Deregulation, 27 J.L. & Econ. 273 (1984).
135. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e) (2000). Competition
was believed to be in the best interest of all participants and the public. See Gordon v. N.Y.
Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 674 (1975).
136. For an overview, see Coffee & Seligman, supra note 21, at 652-54.
137. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,848 (Dec. 22, 1998).
138. For an overview of the move to decimalization, see Karmel, Turning Seats into
Shares, supra note 11, at 373-75. See also Coffee & Seligman, supra note 21, at 655-56.
139. For a brief overview of the National Market System, see infra Part lI.B.
140. See IOSCO on Exchange Demutualization, supra note 7, at 3; see also Carson, supra
note 8, at 5; Press Release, HKEx, Hong Kong Exchanges Starts a New Chapter Following
Completion of Merger (Mar. 6, 2000), available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/0306news4.htm [hereinafter HKEx New Chapter];
Press Release, HKEx, Speech by Mr. Kwong Ki-chi at the HKEx News Conference (Mar. 6,
2000), available at https://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/0306news6.htm [hereinafter
HKEx Kwong Ki-chi Speech].
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as the chairman of the Pacific Exchange, which was leading in the domestic
demutualization process, observed in 1999, "Technology-the lack of it-
was the root of our problem 30 years ago. Today it is the source of both our
challenges and our opportunities."'14 1  And yet more significantly,
"[t]echnology is a beast with an insatiable appetite for resources-faster
processing speeds, greater capacity, bigger bandwidth, and more
programmers."' 142 New technologies have lowered the entry barriers and
made it easier to establish alternative trading systems that compete with the
established stock exchanges. The exchanges themselves have also invested
heavily in new technology, so that we have seen continuously decreasing
trading costs in recent years. 143 Even the New York Stock Exchange, the
"dinosaur"' 144 that even in the Internet age relied on humans to discover
stock prices, finally hoisted the "white flag in the floor-trading war" 145 and
announced creation of a hybrid market, a move that was further supported
by the merger with Archipelago, a market leader in electronic trading. Two
factors here reinforce each other: Declining trading fees allow more
frequent trades; more trades lead to huge economies of scale (once you have
built your trading system, it requires few if any additional funds to handle
more orders), which in turn lead to further fee cuts and once again to more
trades.
3. Globalization
Competition is, to an increasing degree, driven by foreign competitors. 146
Although the globalization of the financial markets is still a relatively new
development, it is nowadays one of the strongest forces in competition.
Stock markets are no longer national monopolies, given how easy it is today
for capital and investors to cross borders, forcing U.S. marketplaces to care
about their global competitiveness.
It is important to note that, notwithstanding the importance of these
developments, their effect is mainly an indirect one, in that they lower entry
141. Robert M. Greber, Chairman, Pacific Exchange, Inc., Public Statement Regarding
Moving Securities Exchanges into the 21st Century (June 15, 1999).
142. Id.
143. See Ian Domowitz & Benn Steil, Automation, Trading Costs, and the Structure of
the Securities Trading Industry, in Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 33
(Robert E. Litan & Anthony M. Santomero eds., 1999); Ian Domowitz & Benn Steil,
Securities Trading, in Technological Innovation & Economic Performance 314 (Benn Steil
et al. eds., 2002).
144. Alan Murray, Juvenile Antics Mar Fight Over NYSE Fate, Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 2005,
at A2.
145. Really Big Board, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 2005, at A12; see also Peter A. McKay,
NYSE's Contrasts With Archipelago Need Reconciling, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 2005, at C 14.
146. Cf Carson, supra note 8, at 5; HKEx New Chapter, supra note 140; HKEx Kwong
Ki-chi Speech, supra note 140.
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barriers and foster competition. As such, deregulation, new technologies,
and globalization would probably not have an important impact on the
organization of stock exchanges, for the latter could enjoy the benefits of
their changing environment without any need for organizational changes.
B. Marketplaces that Compete
Many different stock markets compete for issuers and traders in the
United States and elsewhere. How these markets are connected to each
other (if at all), how orders are routed through them, and how stocks are
actually being traded on them are complex concepts that are usually
referred to as "market structure."
The structure of the U.S. stock market has been one of the hottest issues
in recent years, driven mainly by the various proposals of the SEC to amend
the so-called National Market System, established in 1975 to foster
competition in the field of stock trading. 147  Few proposals in the
Commission's history have caused such intense public debate as these
amendments, 148 even within the SEC, and the Commission has only
recently been able to find a consensus and amend the NMS. 149
For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to outline the basic market
structure without going into regulatory details. 150 As a simplified model,
there are four main categories of marketplaces where stock is traded
domestically:
1. Stock Exchanges
Stock exchanges are those marketplaces registered as national securities
exchanges under the Securities Exchange Act. 151 The number of stock
147. For the goals of the National Market System, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 1 IA(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1) (2000). For an overview of the 1975 Amendments, see
supra Part I.B.3. For a bibliography on the original system, see supra note 67.
148. See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, Thirty Years War, Regulation, Summer 2005, at 54.
149. See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496
(June 29, 2005). But see Aaron Lucchetti, SEC May Delay Implementing New Wall Street
Trading Rules, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 2006, at B3. For the first proposal, see Regulation NMS,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-49325, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,126 (Mar. 9, 2004). The comment
period was extended and supplemental comment requested. See Regulation NMS, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-49749, 69 Fed. Reg. 30,142 (May 26, 2004). Later, the SEC put forward
a new proposal. See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50870, 69 Fed. Reg.
77,424 (Dec. 27, 2004), corrected by 70 Fed. Reg. 1503 (Jan. 7, 2005). The correction was
merely inserting an unintentionally omitted footnote. Id.
150. For an overview and comparative analysis, see Stavros Gkantinis, Regulation and
Innovation: Comparing U.S. and European Equity Trading Markets (February 16, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=887645. For recent overviews of the
former system, see Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of
Current Regulatory and Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition,
2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 399, and Marshall E. Blume, The Structure of the U.S. Equity
Markets, in Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, supra note 4, at 35.
151. Securities Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a).
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exchanges has dramatically decreased in the last century. Whereas in 1900
we had more than one hundred stock exchanges in the United States,152 this
figure declined to thirty-four in 1934,153 to fourteen exchanges registered
with the SEC in 1962,154 and finally to the current seven, which will
increase by one when the Nasdaq Stock Market is finally granted stock
exchange status. Compared to the other marketplaces, stock exchanges face
a disadvantage insofar as the Securities Exchange Act compels them to
regulate the securities markets, while other market organizers can free ride
on the stock exchanges' regulatory expenses.
2. Over-the-Counter Markets
Marketplaces that are not registered as national securities exchanges are
called "over-the-counter" markets. More than forty years ago, the Supreme
Court described such trading as a market "established by traders in the
numerous firms all over the country through a process of constant
communication to one another of the latest offers to buy and sell." 155 The
most important over-the-counter market will be the electronic bulletin board
("OTCBB"), 156 now that Nasdaq itself becomes a stock exchange.
3. Alternative Trading Systems
A third category of marketplaces for stocks emerged in the last decade,
usually referred to as alternative trading systems ("ATS"). In its Regulation
ATS, the SEC defines such trading systems as "any organization,
association, person, group of persons, or system[] [t]hat constitutes,
maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together
purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect
to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange."' 157
This definition is striking insofar as it properly describes what these trading
systems offer an "alternative" to: They furnish execution services that
traditionally were performed by a stock exchange. Hence, to determine
whether a trading system is subject to the SEC's regulation, we have to
refer to the term "stock exchange," a term which to date has not been
152. Coffee & Seligman, supra note 21, at 23.
153. Mahoney, supra note 33, at 1477.
154. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 350 (1963).
155. Id. at 348.
156. See NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2006); OTCBB,
http://www.otcbb.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2004); see also Press Release, Nasdaq, Nasdaq
to Transfer OTCBB Business to the NASD (July 8, 2005), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2005/nesection05 068.stm.
157. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a)-(a)(1) (2005). See generally Regulation of Exchanges
and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg.
70,844, 70,848 (Dec. 22, 1998). For a critique before the adoption of Regulation ATS, see
Polly Nyquist, Failure to Engage: The Regulation of Proprietary Trading Systems, 13 Yale
L. & Pol'y Rev. 281 (1995).
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precisely defined, and will, by its nature, most likely never be so defined. 158
The main category of such alternative trading systems is electronic
communication networks ("ECN"), 159 such as INET, a subsidiary of
Instinet Group, Inc., which began operations as early as 1969.160 Another
example was Archipelago, which later was combined with two national
securities exchanges and recently merged with the New York Stock
Exchange.
4. Block Trading
For trades in large blocks of stocks (generally over 10,000 shares or the
equivalent of $200,000), there exist various markets and platforms that
allow institutional investors to sell and buy such blocks. 161 The main
advantage of such facilities is that investors can trade anonymously without
attracting the notice of the market. 162 Technological developments might
increase such direct trades in the future.
Due to modem communications, foreign marketplaces of all four kinds,
can and increasingly do, attract investors from the United States. 163
When stocks of the same issuer are traded on different markets, there
arise several regulatory concerns. Such market fragmentation leads to a
loss of liquidity at each place and might cause the discovery of differing
prices. Furthermore, the decision of the brokers about where to execute the
customers' orders can be influenced by selfish motives, such as where the
broker gets the highest kickback (often referred to euphemistically as
"payment for order-flow"). 164 It is such issues that the National Market
System and other regulations address. And it is no coincidence that,
considering the far-reaching consequences of the new National Market
158. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (2000). The
definition is further described in 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16 (2005). For more details, see supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
159. For a definition of electronic communication networks ("ECNs"), see 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.11Acl-I(a)(8).
160. Coffee & Seligman, supra note 21, at 625.
161. James D. Cox et al., Securities Regulation 92 (4th ed. 2004); see also Coffee &
Seligman, supra note 21, at 33.
162. For an example, see Coffee & Seligman, supra note 21, at 38-42.
163. For an overview, see S. Eric Wang, Investing Abroad. Regulation S and U.S. Retail
Investment in Foreign Securities, 10 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 329 (2002), and Howell E.
Jackson, Mark Gurevich & Andreas M. Fleckner, The Controversy over the Placement of
Remote Trading Screens from Foreign Exchanges in the US. (Nov. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
164. See Note, The Perils of Payment for Order Flow, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1675 (1994).
These practices are nicely described by Michael Schroeder and Randall Smith, Sweeping
Change in Market Structure Sought, Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 2000, at C1 ("[O]nline brokers
keep control over their customers' order flow either by executing the orders within their own
trading operations, or by shipping them out to firms that pay for such orders.").
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System, only two weeks after its adoption the New York Stock Exchange
announced its merger with Archipelago and the Nasdaq Stock Market
announced the takeover of Instinet's trading division. Concededly, such
transactions were planned long before, but they were planned taking into
account the probable new regulatory environment. Having been archrivals
in different markets for a long time, in the new regime the New York Stock
Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market will get closer to each other. It
might be the beginning of a long-lasting duopoly.
C. Subjects of Competition
The competition among marketplaces has two dimensions: Marketplaces
compete for listings and for orders. To get more listings, stock exchanges
have to attract issuers. To get more orders, stock exchanges have to attract
traders. Both kinds of competition correlate: Marketplaces that have more
listings attract more traders, and marketplaces with more traders catch the
attention of more issuers. This correlation explains why stock markets tend
to become oligopolies or even monopolies: The bigger a market is, the
more it draws away the competitors' remaining customers. Liquidity is a
magnet for more liquidity-a well-known insight discussed under the
heading "network theory." Not surprisingly, the number of domestic stock
exchanges declined over the last century from over one hundred to the
current seven. 165
On the other hand, as a factor that reduces the concentration tendency,
stock exchanges no longer offer a unique product. Modem technologies
reduce entrance barriers to establishing marketplaces for stocks, and
provide investors everywhere in the world with services that originally were
reserved to stock exchanges. Congress intended to support this
development through the introduction of the NMS, which was supposed to
ensure "fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange
markets, and between exchange markets and markets other than exchange
markets." 166  The last thirty years have certainly brought the desired
competition, albeit perhaps different than expected: Competition for traders
is strong, while competition for listings has so far been weak. It is difficult
to judge whether this is good policy or not. Unlike in other areas,
competition for issuers is only to a certain degree desirable in the stock
markets, because it leads to fragmented markets and split liquidity. On the
other hand, too much concentration hinders economic progress and raises
antitrust concerns.
The following representation of the subjects of competition starts with
the competition for listings 167 and turns then to the competition for
165. See supra Part II.B.I.
166. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 1 IA(a)(1)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(ii)
(2000).
167. See infra Part I1.C.1.
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orders. 168 Both subsections distinguish between competition from domestic
and from foreign marketplaces.
1. Competition for Listings
The major domestic competitors in the "battle for issuers" are the New
York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market. Both compete heavily
for new issuers, as was recently seen during the initial public offering of
Google. 169 Once an issuer is listed, however, the competition is weak.
Typically an issuer will start small, with a listing on Nasdaq, and then as a
seasoned company move later to the New York Stock Exchange. 170
Not surprisingly, the Nasdaq Stock Market tries to attack this seemingly
natural rule by convincing seasoned issuers to list their stocks exclusively,
or at least dually, on the Nasdaq Stock Market. So far, Nasdaq's efforts
have been nearly without effect. 171 Dual listings are so rare that the Nasdaq
Stock Market even places advertisements when a company decides to dual
list on Nasdaq.172 Another marketplace competing for dual listings is the
Archipelago Exchange. It has been more successful, and drawn some
notable companies for dual listing. 173 However, its merger with the New
York Stock Exchange eliminates the competition between the two
exchanges.
Increasingly, competition for international listings comes from
marketplaces abroad. 174 Today, 452 foreign issuers are listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, down from a peak of 473 in 2002.175 In recent
years, the U.S. markets seem to have lost their attractiveness to foreign
168. See infra Part II.C.2.
169. See Robin Sidel, Google Plans to List on Nasdaq, Joining Ranks of Tech Notables,
Wall St. J., July 13, 2004, at C5. For a discussion about the competition for listings, see
Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close
Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1007 (1990).
170. Coffee & Seligman, supra note 21, at 26.
171. See Gaston F. Ceron, Nasdaq Gains Little in NYSE Fight, Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 2005,
at C3.
172. See, e.g., Wall St. J., May 2, 2005, at C7 (advertisement announcing the dual listing
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Holdings); Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 2005, at A5
(advertisement announcing that "Cadence is now solely listed on Nasdaq").
173. See, e.g., Theo Francis, AIG, Long Traded on Big Board, Adds a Listing on
Archipelago, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at C3; see also Joseph Weber, Taking Aim at the Big
Board, Bus. Wk., Nov. 8, 2004, at 102.
174. For an overview of the share of foreign issuers on twenty-six exchanges worldwide,
see Schich & Wehinger, supra note 43, at 93. See also generally Stijn Claessens et al.,
Accessing International Equity Markets: What Firms from Which Countries Go Abroad?
(2003), available at
http://www.dise.unisa.it/PDF/Accessing%201nternational%20MarketsMarchl 3.pdf; Sofia
B. Ramos, Competition Between Stock Exchanges: A Survey (Int'l Center for Fin. Asset
Mgmt. & Eng'g, Working Paper No. 77, Feb. 2003), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=410727.
175. See Andreas M. Fleckner, Foreign Issuers on the New York Stock Exchange (Feb.
17, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (earlier draft prepared for the EU-
US Financial Services Roundtable, Cambridge, United Kingdom, Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 2005).
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issuers (for example, only eleven new European offerings since 2001;176 the
number of Latin American issuers listed on the New York Stock Exchange
has decreased from 103 in 2001 to the current figure of eighty-eight). 177
There are different explanations for this development. Many observers
blame the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 178 and the increased regulatory costs that
came with it. 179 Another explanation might be that in today's regulatory
environment, issuers need not be listed in the United States when they want
to reach U.S. investors. 180
That foreign companies stay at home is only one step. Another would be
that U.S. companies start to look abroad-as they did during the heyday of
the new economy, 181 and as some kinds of businesses still do. 182
Globalization has made financing companies much more flexible, with the
result that cross-border capital flows have increased dramatically. 183
Issuers today are willing and able to cross borders and raise money abroad.
That means that in the middle and long term, the main competitors for the
New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq will not be domestic marketplaces,
but instead Frankfurt, Hong Kong, London, Paris, and Tokyo. Against this
background, it is hardly unreasonable that the conservative New York Stock
Exchange is considering breaking taboos and opening earlier to attract
European issuers (as well as traders). 184 And even yet more revolutionary,
the New York Stock Exchange is considering trading other products such as
derivatives, bonds, and exchange-traded funds185-a clear sign that listing
176. Id.
177. Id; see also Amy Guthrie, Mexican Firms Leave NYSE, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 2005, at
C14; Aaron Lucchetti & Craig Karmin, Intensity to Be a 'Global' Stock Has Waned, Wall St.
J., May 10, 2005, at Cl.
178. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
179. See 404 Tonnes of Paper, Economist, Dec. 18, 2004, at 116; see also Daniel Epstein,
Goodbye, Farewell, Auf Wiedersehen, Adieu..., Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 2005, at A10; Lucchetti
& Karmin, supra note 177.
180. See Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International
Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999-Part II (2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). For Part I, see Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory
Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999-Part I, 56
Bus. Law. 653 (2001). See also Wang, supra note 163; Jackson, Gurevich & Fleckner, supra
note 163.
181. The "new markets" in Europe, such as the Neuer Markt in Frankfurt, were able to
attract a significant number of high-tech companies that normally would have gone public on
the Nasdaq Stock Market, but preferred the European alternatives.
182. Jeff D. Opdyke, Wall Street North: Listing in Toronto Piques U.S. Interest, Wall St.
J., Mar. 24, 2005, at Cl.
183. See Cox et al., supra note 161, at 93-94 (reporting impressive figures).
184. Gaston F. Ceron & Aaron Lucchetti, Big Board May Extend Trading Day, Wall St.
J., Jan. 27, 2005, at C3; Early Open at NYSE? Not Yet, Thain Says, Wall St. J., Sept. 23,
2005, at C3.
185. Big Board Advances ETF Plans, Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 2005, at Al; Ceron, supra note
94; Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE Seat Price Increases 23%, Largest in 6 Years, Wall St. J., Jan.
25, 2005, at C3; Aaron Lucchetti et al., NYSE to Acquire Electronic Trader And Go Public,
Wall St. J., Apr. 21, 2005, at Al; Aaron Lucchetti & David Reilly, NYSE CEO Thain Wants
to Trade More Than Just Stocks, Wall St. J., June 23, 2005, at Cl; Peter A. McKay, NYSE,
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stocks alone is no longer considered sufficient. Derivatives, especially,
offer interesting options, since the stock exchanges themselves "create"
these securities, meaning that, unlike the situation with stocks, exchanges
do not have to lure issuers but only traders.
On balance, domestic competition for issuers is still weak but increasing
in strength, an effect that should yet be intensified by the overhauled
National Market System. Meanwhile, developed marketplaces abroad
emerge as serious competitors.
2. Competition for Orders
The "battle for orders" is probably more important than the competition
for issuers, as it tends to generate more revenue than the listing itself.186 It
is also much more complex, as the battle is fought among all four kinds of
markets that trade stocks domestically and abroad.
Competition for orders is driven by various factors, the most important of
course being trading costs. Non-cost factors considered by most investors
include liquidity, reliability, execution speed, and the quality of price
discovery. Particularly for traders of huge blocks, anonymity is also a
crucial factor, and one that stock exchanges normally do not offer. Last but
not least, kickbacks (also known as payments for order-flow) influence the
allocation of orders.
Competition and fragmentation of the market for orders differ
significantly among distinct groups of stocks. The New York Stock
Exchange could for a long time hold a market share of roughly eighty
percent in the trading of stocks of issuers that were primarily listed on the
New York Stock Exchange, 187 a number that only recently dropped below
seventy-five percent, for the first time since that data has been collected. 188
Conversely, the trade in stocks listed primarily on the Nasdaq Stock Market
is much more fragmented. The Archipelago Exchange gives a good
impression of this distinction: Archipelago holds a twenty-five percent
market share in Nasdaq stocks, but only a two percent share in New York
Stock Exchange listed issuers, despite some 230 dual listings. 189 Yet more
Archipelago Plan to Offer a Variety of Financial Products, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 2005, at C1;
Christine Richard, SEC Gives Big Board Green Light To Finalize Corporate-Bond Plan,
Wall St. J., July 13, 2005, at C4.
186. See Schich & Wehinger, supra note 43, at 100 (comparing income sources).
187. Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-50699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,131 (Dec. 8, 2004) (providing general
information and figures); see also William 0. Brown, Jr., et al., Competing with the NYSE
(August 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=785427.
188. See Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE's Market Dominance Slips, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 2005, at
C I [hereinafter Luchetti, NYSE's Market Dominance Slips]; Aaron Lucchetti, What Kind of
Stock Will the NYSE Itself Be?, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 2005, at CI.
189. Lucchetti et al., supra note 185; Weber, supra note 173; see also Van T. Nguyen et
al., Archipelago's Move Towards Exchange Status: An Analysis of Archipelago Trading in
NYSE and NASDAQ Stocks (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=720322. In 2005, Archipelago's share in stocks listed on the New
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threatening for the Nasdaq Stock Market is the competition with alternative
trading systems. Although there are different estimations, the consensus is
that electronic communication networks now handle roughly half of
Nasdaq-listed stock.190
As for the competition for issuers, domestic marketplaces increasingly
feel the squeeze from foreign marketplaces and have to respond.
Archipelago Exchange announced that it would start its trading at four
o'clock a.m. Eastern Time to attract European investors. 191  And, as
previously mentioned, even the New York Stock Exchange (which is
merging with Archipelago) is considering opening earlier to attract
European traders. 192
D. Competitive Advantages of Public Stock Exchanges
Having outlined the elements that foster competition, the markets that
compete, and the goals of that competition, the Article turns now to the
question of why demutualized and publicly traded stock exchanges will do
better than exchanges under the traditional mutual structure: the new
structure makes it easier to raise money, 193 facilitates decision making, 194
and fosters consolidation.195
1. Raising Money
As already indicated, for decades, even centuries, stock exchanges
offered little more than a large room (the exchange floor). Today, however,
stock exchanges provide their traders with high-end technology, state-of-
the-art information systems, and trade settlement within seconds.
Technological advances represent one of the main forces driving
competition among stock markets, allowing marketplaces with new
technology to cut costs and lower prices without incurring losses.
However, running modem stock exchanges, and having the trading
system and other facilities up-to-date, requires large amounts of money.
The traditional mutual form cannot fulfill all capital needs because
ownership is here restricted to brokers and dealers, which significantly
York Stock Exchange rose from 1.6 percent to 3.7 percent. See Lucchetti, NYSE's Market
Dominance Slips, supra note 188.
190. See Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 71,131; Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No.
34-50700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,258 (Dec. 8, 2004).
191. Press Release, Archipelago, Electronic Exchange's Early Opening to Coincide with
European Trading Hours, Creating More Open, Transparent Markets (Nov. 23, 2004),
available at http://investor.archipelago.com/phoenix.zhtml?c= 140290&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=647127&highlight=- .
192. Ceron & Lucchetti, supra note 184; Early Open at NYSE? Not Yet, Thain Says,
supra note 184.
193. See infra Part II.D.1.
194. See infra Part II.D.2.
195. See infra Part II.D.3.
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limits the possible capital suppliers and makes it difficult to obtain the
funds necessary to maintain modem trading systems. Not surprisingly,
then, stock exchanges regularly point to their capital needs when explaining
their reasons for demutualization, as stressed for instance by the New York
Stock Exchange,196  the Pacific Exchange,197  the London Stock
Exchange,1 98 and the Nasdaq Stock Market.199
2. Decision Making
Demutualization leads to dramatic changes in the management structure
of stock exchanges, a factor that has been somewhat neglected in legal
scholarship thus far.200 Under the traditional structure, the broker-dealers
are the key decision makers. With demutualization, and a subsequent initial
public offering, however, ownership and control separate. Outside
stockholders provide nothing more than capital. As in any other public
company with dispersed ownership, small stockholders have a rational
disinterest in actively contributing to the company's well-being. Thus, the
power shifts from the broker-dealers to senior management when stock
exchanges go public. This makes it much easier to run a business in a
highly competitive environment than under the mutual structure. Said the
chairman of the Pacific Exchange when the exchange demutualized:
Membership organizations, especially exchanges, can be frustrating. It is
difficult to implement new policies and new strategic decisions. The
members, acting through committees or voting en masse on Constitutional
amendments, must bless each significant change. Even where reform and
enhancement is widely supported, the time necessary to secure committee
and member approval can seem interminable.20 1
Moreover, the interests of the members often conflict with the long-term
interests of the exchange. For instance, floor brokers oppose electronic
trading systems, which make their workplace obsolete, but in the long term
the stock exchange may need to invest in such a system to defend its market
share. And for the stock exchange to succeed in drawing investors, it may
196. Grasso Statement, supra note 83.
197. Press Release, Pac. Exch., Pacific Exchange Board Approves Demutualization,
Screen-Based Trading Plans (Dec. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.pacificex.com/news/press/press-2000/abtpress 00 dec board.html [hereinafter
Pacific Exchange Approves]; Press Release, Pac. Exch., SEC Approves Pacific Exchange
Demutualization Plan (May 20, 2004), available at
http://www.pacificex.com/news/press/press-2004/press_04_secapproval.html [hereinafter
SEC Approves Pacific Exchange].
198. Cowell, supra note 124.
199. See Press Release, Nasdaq, supra note 122. But see supra notes 15, 116.
200. But see Oliver Hart & John Moore, The Governance of Exchanges: Members'
Cooperatives Versus Outside Ownership, Oxford Rev. of Econ. Pol'y, Winter 1996, at 53;
Steil, supra note 11, at 68-71. For an economic analysis of stock exchange governance, see
generally Craig Pirrong, A Theory of Financial Exchange Organization, 43 J.L. & Econ. 437
(2000).
201. Greber, supra note 141.
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need to reduce the spreads between ask and bid prices-a change that
directly reduces the broker-dealers' income.
Managers of stock exchanges cautiously admit that one of the critical
advantages in demutualized exchanges is the greater discretion they have.
This has been acknowledged by all demutualized exchanges in the United
States-the Chicago Stock Exchange, 20 2 the Pacific Exchange, 20 3 and the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, 204 as well as during the New York Stock
Exchange's failed attempt in 1999 2 5-and the demutualization of the
Australian Stock Exchange20 6 and the London Stock Exchange. 20 7 The
need for demutualization of the other exchanges grows more pressing with
every stock exchange that demutualizes, because more and more
competitors will no longer be member organizations and will therefore have
more flexibility in decision making.
The impact on the decision making within the stock exchange seems to
be at least equally as important as raising money, given that publicly traded
stock exchanges have only rarely raised money after demutualization, and
many of them have hoarded that cash. That the managers of stock
exchanges nonetheless put so much emphasis on raising money might have
an easy explanation: It is the members who make the decision to
demutualize. Suggesting that the purpose of demutualization is to remove
their powers would probably not help win their approval for
demutualization.
3. Consolidation
Running a stock exchange is one of the best examples of economies of
scale. Once an exchange has set up the trading facilities (such as floors and
electronic systems), drafted the rules, formulated the corporate governance
standards, and so forth, there are almost no further costs, regardless of the
number of transactions performed at the exchange. The managing director
of the Australian Stock Exchange has said that
we have a very high proportion of fixed costs, much of it in computer and
communications equipment, and a correspondingly low proportion of
variable costs. The result is that, above a certain level, increased trading
202. Press Release, Chi. Stock Exch., Chicago Stock Exchange Board of Governors
Approves Demutualization Plan (Aug. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.chx.com/pressroom/press-article.asp?PR Date=08/05/04 [hereinafter Chicago
Stock Exchange Board of Governors Press Release]; Press Release, Chi. Stock Exch.,
Chicago Stock Exchange Members Approve Demutualization Plan (Nov. 11, 2004),
available at http://www.chx.com/pressroom/press-article.asp?PRDate= 11/11/04.
203. Greber, supra note 141.
204. Press Release, Phila. Stock Exch., Philadelphia Stock Exchange Board of Governors
Authorizes PHLX Management to Pursue Demutualization Plan for the Exchange (Dec. 12,
2002), available at http://www.phlx.com/news/pr2002/02pr1212.html.
205. Grasso Statement, supra note 83.
206. Humphry, supra note 123.
207. Cowell, supra note 124.
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volumes in our markets don't just flow through to revenue, they largely
flow through to profit.
20 8
And the chairman of the Pacific Exchange stated, "Drive more products
over a single platform and you drive down the cost of each transaction. '20 9
If two exchanges merge, they can almost halve most of their fixed
expenses, like updating the trading system and reviewing their rules and
corporate governance standards. Against this background, it is no wonder
that stock exchanges oftentimes praise the advantages of consolidation and
strategic partnerships when they demutualize and go public. Examples
include the Chicago Stock Exchange,210 the New York Stock Exchange, 2 11
the Pacific Exchange, 212 the Philadelphia Stock Exchange,213 and abroad,
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong.214 And, as in other sectors, stock
exchanges increasingly consider their stock as currency during takeovers.2 15
We have already seen such consolidations: in Europe, Euronext (built of
four stock exchanges) 216 and OMX Group (combined from five); 217 in the
United States, Pacific Exchange and Archipelago,218 as well as Nasdaq
Stock Market, BRUT, and Instinet (most of them were not registered as
national securities exchanges when they merged). Nothing seems
impossible-even rumors about a merger of the Nasdaq Stock Market and
208. Press Release, ASX, supra note 54.
209. Greber, supra note 141.
210. Chicago Stock Exchange Board of Governors Press Release, supra note 202.
211. Grasso Statement, supra note 83 (mentioning "strategic alliances" with respect to the
failed attempt of 1999).
212. Pacific Exchange Approves, supra note 197; Press Release, Pac. Exch., Pacific
Exchange Board Unanimously Approves Corporate Restructuring, Demutualization (Sept.
16, 2003), available at http://www.pacificex.com/news/press/press-
2003/press 03 demutual.html; Press Release, Pac. Exch., Pacific Exchange Demutualization
Effort Advances (Sept. 29, 2000), available at http://www.pacificex.com/news/press/press-
2000/abt_press 00 demutual.html; Press Release, Pac. Exch., Pacific Exchange
Demutualization Plan Approved (Jan. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.pacificex.com/news/press/press-2004/press 04 demutualization.html; SEC
Approves Pacific Exchange, supra note 197; Press Release, Pac. Exch., SEC Publishes
Pacific Exchange Demutualization Proposal (Mar. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.pacificex.com/news/press/press-2004/press_04proposal.html.
213. Press Release, Phila. Stock Exch., supra note 204.
214. See Press Release, HKEx, Speech by Mr. Lee Yeh-kwong, Charles at the HKEx
News Conference (Mar. 6, 2000), available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/0306news5.htm; see also HKEx New Chapter,
supra note 140.
215. Deutsche Bdrse Shares Jump, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2001, at Wl (citing then-
Deutsche B6rse CEO Wemer Seifert); Pacific Exchange Approves, supra note 197; see also
Press Release, Nasdaq, supra note 122.
216. See Euronext, History,
http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/0,5371,1732_4427342,00.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2005).
217. See OMX, About OMX; Management,
http://www.omxgroup.com/omxcorp/aboutomx/Management/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
218. See Archipelago, Our History, http://www.archipelago.com/inside/story.asp (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005).
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the New York Stock Exchange found their way into the press. 2 19 After the
CEO of the New York Stock Exchange, John A. Thain, said, "We have too
many exchanges," 220 it took only six weeks until the announcement of the
merger with Archipelago and of Nasdaq's takeover of Instinet.
Consolidation among stock markets is a good example of how
technology can prompt a certain market structure. A century ago, it made
economic sense to have separate stock exchanges on the West Coast and on
the East Coast. Communication, restricted to phone calls, telegrams, and
mail, was expensive and time-consuming. Today, in the Internet age, it
does not matter where in the United States or the world you are based. The
better the means of communication, the less efficient, comparatively, are
regional exchanges.
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Demutualization is far from being free of challenges. Various regulatory
problems arise when stock exchanges demutualize, go public, and list their
stock. If we are unable to address the challenges that come with this
progress, the traditional regulatory system-most importantly the concept
of self-regulation-faces an uncertain future. This is why so many
observers are worried about the progress of demutualization and the
changes it brings.
All regulatory concerns related to demutualization arise from one source:
the stock exchanges' regulatory powers. Without its public mandate, a
stock exchange could be treated as any other financial institution. But with
the far-reaching regulatory powers that Congress and the SEC have
conferred on the stock exchanges, their organizational structure needs our
utmost attention, most importantly regarding conflicts of interest that might
divert the stock exchanges from fulfilling their regulatory duties and the
trust with which they have been invested.
The possibility of conflicts of interest in publicly traded stock exchanges
is not an invention of outsiders. The stock exchanges themselves are,
though to a lesser degree, aware of these problems.2 2 1 The chief regulatory
officer of the New York Stock Exchange, for instance, acknowledges that
there are "undeniably" conflicts related to self-regulation, 222 and also, as he
219. See Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, NASDAQ Chief Approaches NYSE to Explore
Merger, Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 2003, at Al; see also Press Release, Nasdaq, A Statement From
NASDAQ (Dec. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2003/ne-section03_1l11 .html (denying this
"unverified story based on rumors and speculation").
220. NYSE Seeks Approval for Changes, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 2005, at C4 (quoting John A.
Thain).
221. See generally Carson, supra note 8, passim (containing numerous sections about the
"exchange view"); see also id. at 20 ("Some exchanges acknowledged that under
competitive pressure, standards could slip without strong oversight.").
222. Mara Der Hovanesian, Big Stick At the Big Board, Bus. Wk., Nov. 15, 2004, at 84
(citing Richard G. Ketchum).
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acknowledged before a House committee recently, the New York Stock
Exchange "has not always lived up to our own high standards in ensuring
investor protection and market integrity. '223 That is a rather nice way to
refer to the not so infrequent cases in which self-regulatory organizations
have shown enforcement deficits, apparently as a result of influence by
business interests. 224 Put in a nutshell, stock exchanges "are not immune
from governance missteps"-so says none other than William H.
Donaldson, former chairman of both the New York Stock Exchange and the
SEC.225 To the extent that demutualization increases the likelihood of such
"missteps," Congress and the SEC must think about offering more
"guidance."
This part examines the regulatory challenges that demand the proposed
changes. The presentation commences with an overview of the regulatory
powers of stock exchanges that cause the concerns, 226 and turns then to the
various conflicts of interests that arise when stock exchanges demutualize
and go public.227
A. Regulatory Environment
Among the institutions that offer financial services, stock exchanges are
out of the ordinary. Concededly, like other financial institutions such as
banks, insurance companies, or investment funds, stock exchanges are
regulated. But unlike other institutions, stock exchanges are also regulators,
insofar as they have regulatory powers over their markets and the market
participants, a concept known as "self-regulation. '228
This section commences with the underlying idea of self-regulation, 229
followed by a discussion of both the governmental powers over stock
223. Self-Regulatory Organizations: Exploring the Need for Reform: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong. 8 (2005) (statement of Richard G. Ketchum,
Chief Regulatory Officer, NYSE) [hereinafter Ketchum Statement].
224. An example of this is the enforcement deficits that led to the separation of the
regulatory arm of the National Association of Securities Dealers. See Nat'l Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-37538, 62 SEC Docket 1346 (Aug. 8, 1996).
For the recently settled investigations against the New York Stock Exchange and its
specialists, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges the New York Stock
Exchange with Failing to Police Specialists (Apr. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-53.htm.
225. Donaldson, supra note 13.
226. See infra Part III.A.
227. See infra Part III.B-H.
228. The SEC regularly emphasizes this aspect. See Fair Administration and Governance
of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50699, 69 Fed. Reg.
71,126, 71,128 (Nov. 18, 2004) (stating in the very first sentence that "[t]he system of
regulation for our Nation's securities markets and market participants is grounded on the
principle of self-regulation").
229. See infra Part III.A. 1.
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exchanges (regulation of stock exchanges), 230 as well as the self-regulatory
powers of stock exchanges (regulation by stock exchanges). 231
1. Concept of Self-Regulation
The Securities Exchange Act establishes a two-tiered approach for the
regulation of the stock markets: self-regulation, coupled with governmental
oversight,232  a concept that is applied to (1) national securities
exchanges, 233 (2) registered securities associations,234 (3) registered
clearing agencies,235 and (4) various other organizations. 236 This Article is
limited to national securities exchanges, which are often referred to simply
as "stock exchanges." The governmental oversight of such exchanges is
carried out by the Securities and Exchange Commission, a federal
administrative agency that was inaugurated in 1934 by the Securities
Exchange Act.2 37
What does self-regulation mean? The standard definition describes self-
regulation as a regulatory regime under which an organization or industry
sector establishes its own rules and regulates itself accordingly. 238 Under
the current system, stock exchanges are, to a considerable extent, self-
regulators because they set the rules for the markets they organize. This
regime is self-regulatory because the market participants are involved in the
rulemaking process. In particular, representatives of the distinct
constituencies must be on the stock exchange's boards,2 39 namely
executives representing member firms that deal with the public, specialists,
floor brokers, lessor members, listed companies, institutional investors, and
individual investors. 240 Therefore, the stock exchange's constituencies set
230. See infra Part III.A.2.
231. See infra Part III.A.3.
232. Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 667 (1975); see also Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1973). See generally Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(26), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2000).
233. Securities Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f.
234. Id. § 15(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78(0-3).
235. Id. § 17(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78. For the question of whether a system is an exchange or
a clearing agency, see Board of Trade v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1991), and Board of
Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1989).
236. The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board ("MSRB"), established by Securities
Exchange Act § 15B, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b), is treated as a self-regulatory organization solely
for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act §§ 19(b), 19(c), and 23(b) (15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b),
78s(c), and 78w(b)). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act recently added the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"). See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7211-7219 (Supp. II).
237. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d. For a general introduction,
see supra Part I.B.2.
238. Cf Black's Law Dictionary 1391 (8th ed. 2004) (defining self-regulation as "[a]n
organization's or industry's control, oversight, or direction of itself according to rules and
standards that it establishes").
239. Securities Exchange Act § 6(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(3); see, e.g., NYSE
Constitution art. IV, § 2 (Board of Directors); id. art. V, § 2 (Board of Executives).
240. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., supra note 43, at 49.
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the rules for themselves, or, to be more precise, through the stock exchange
as a separate regulatory body.
The underlying idea of self-regulation is to benefit from the industry's
wisdom and superior knowledge compared to the government. If anyone
can best understand and identify fraudulent and illegal behavior, so the
argument goes, it is the industry itself Furthermore, rules enacted by the
affected persons tend to be accepted and observed sooner than rules set by
outsiders. 241 Another acknowledged advantage of self-regulation is that
self-regulatory organizations can rely on the industry's funds, and are
therefore better and more efficiently funded than a governmental agency.242
Needless to say, resting solely on self-regulation bears some risks,
because self-regulators are not disinterested but instead biased by their
industry affiliation. That is where government comes in, providing, or at
least threatening, impartial control. No one said it better than the former
chairman of the SEC, Justice William 0. Douglas: "[Self-Regulation] is
letting the exchanges take the leadership with Government playing a
residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the
door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would
never have to be used. 243
2. Regulation of Stock Exchanges (Governmental Powers)
Governmental oversight of stock exchanges can be divided into two
parts: First, there are certain requirements for registration as a self-
regulatory organization; second, the SEC continuously monitors and
controls the stock exchanges' conduct.
Stock exchanges have to register with the Commission before they can
open their market to investors; transactions on unregistered exchanges are,
unless an exemption applies, unlawful.244 An exchange will not be
registered as a national securities exchange unless it is
so organized and has the capacity to be able to carry out the purposes of
[the Securities Exchange Act] and to comply, and.., to enforce
compliance by its members and persons associated with its members, with
the provisions of [the Securities Exchange Act], the rules and regulations
thereunder, and the rules of the exchange. 245
241. IOSCO on Exchange Demutualization, supra note 7, at 6. In addition, self-
regulatory organizations may be better able to respond to misconduct that falls short of
fraud. See Coffee & Seligman, supra note 21, at 673-74.
242. Coffee & Seligman, supra note 21, at 73, 673. For an overview of the said main
advantages of self-regulation, see Dombalagian, supra note 63, at 1093-1100.
243. Douglas, supra note 62, at 82. Justice William 0. Douglas was Chairman of the
SEC from September 21, 1937, to April 16, 1939. See SEC, Concise Directory,
http://www.sec.gov/about/concise.shtml#history (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
244. Securities Exchange Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 78e.
245. Id § 6(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(1).
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Congress has enacted a detailed catalogue of requirements that must be
fulfilled. 246 For the SEC, the seven most important are: 247
[1] The rules of the [national securities] exchange assure a fair
representation of its members in the selection of its directors and
administration of its affairs and provide that one or more directors shall be
representative of issuers and investors and not be associated with a
member of the exchange, broker, or dealer; 248
(2) "The rules of the exchange [or association respectively] provide for the
equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among its
members and issuers and other persons using its facilities [and systems]; ' '249
(3) "rules of the exchange [or association] are designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices;" (4) "to promote just and
equitable principles of trade;" (5) "to remove impediments to and perfect
the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system,
and, in general;" (6) "to protect investors and the public interest. '250 And
finally
[7] [t]he rules of the exchange provide that.., its members and
persons associated with its members shall be appropriately disciplined for
violation of the provisions of [the Securities Exchange Act], the rules or
regulations thereunder, or the rules of the exchange, by expulsion,
suspension, limitation of activities, functions, and operations, fine,
censure, being suspended or barred from being associated with a member,
or any other fitting sanction....
[Such rules must] provide a fair procedure for the disciplining of
members and persons associated with members. 251
When an exchange fulfills these requirements and gets registered, the
governmental powers over that exchange are far from exhausted. As
explained in earlier parts of this Article, the SEC has acquired increasing
power over the stock exchanges in recent decades, making the stock
exchanges more like subsidiaries of the Commission than the private clubs
that they once were. It is this already existing power of the Commission
that argues against much more regulation in the case of demutualization and
going public of stock exchanges, as the Article will point out later.
As a general guideline, the Commission has to take action whenever a
stock exchange does not sufficiently protect investors. 252 While in earlier
246. See id. § 6(b)(2)-(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(2)-(9).
247. See Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-50699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,128-29 (Dec. 8, 2004); see
also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 128-29 (1973)
(listing these requirements).
248. See Securities Exchange Act § 6(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(3).
249. See id. § 6(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(4).
250. See id. § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5).
251. See id. § 6(b)(6)-(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(6)-(7).
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days it could be said that the SEC's general function was supervisory, 253 the
1975 Amendments gave the Commission a significantly more active role. 254
Out of the broad range of powers that the SEC has over stock exchanges,
the most noteworthy are: 255
(1) Stock exchanges have to file with the SEC if they want to change
their rules. Absent exemptions, changes do not take effect unless the
Commission has approved the proposed rule change. 256
(2) If the SEC does not like the existing rules of a stock exchange, the
Commission is empowered to abrogate, add to, and delete from rules of the
stock exchange. 257
(3) The SEC can even amend a stock exchange's Constitution and
Certificate of Incorporation.258  For instance, as expressly stated, the
Commission can increase the number of seats at a stock exchange if the
current limit overly hinders competition. 259
(4) The SEC can investigate whether persons regulated by the stock
exchanges comply with the Securities Exchange Act, the rules or
regulations thereunder, and the rules of the national securities exchange. 260
(5) If stock exchanges do not fulfill their obligations under the Securities
Exchange Act or the rules promulgated thereunder, the SEC is empowered
to impose limitations on their business 261 or remove their officers and
directors. 262 If such actions are not an adequate response to the misconduct,
the Commission is authorized to suspend or revoke the registration of the
noncomplying stock exchange. 263
(6) The SEC reviews the disciplinary actions that self-regulatory
organizations impose on their members. 264
252. Merrill Lynch, 414 U.S. at 130; Fair Administration and Governance of Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,128.
253. Merrill Lynch, 414 U.S. at 129.
254. See supra Part I.B.3.
255. For the powers that the SEC has identified as the most important, see Fair
Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,128-
29.
256. Securities Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b). But see Proposed Rule
Changes of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49505, 69 Fed.
Reg. 17,864 (Apr. 5, 2004).
257. Securities Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c).
258. For the definition of "rules of an exchange," see id. § 3(27), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(27).
259. Id. § 6(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(4). For the number of seats at the New York Stock
Exchange, see Certificate of Incorporation of the NYSE, Inc. § 13 (showing that there are
1366 seats).
260. Securities Exchange Act § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a). At any rate, the SEC can
discipline brokers and dealers directly when they are, as usually they are, registered with the
SEC. See id. § 15(b)(4)-(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)-(6); cf Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 923 F.2d
1270, 1276 (7th Cir. 1991) (Flaum, J., dissenting).
261. Securities Exchange Act § 19(h)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1).
262. Id. § 19(h)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(4).
263. Id. § 19(h)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1).
264. Id. § 19(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2).
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(7) The SEC can demand all information necessary to fulfill its
oversight function. Stock exchanges are required to keep records and to file
reports with the Commission.265 The records are subject to examinations
by the Commission.266
Despite these broad powers, there remain areas in which stock exchanges
have power that the SEC does not have, for the Commission's powers are
limited to advancing the goals of the Securities Exchange Act. The best
known example of such an area is the set of rules that governs the issuers'
corporate governance. 267 As held in the seminal Business Roundtable v.
SEC decision, the Commission lacks authority to initiate corporate
governance rules or to intervene against them.268
In addition to the SEC there are two other major players in the
governmental oversight of stock exchanges. The first is Congress. The
facts of the landmark Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange case give a nice
illustration of the interplay between the Commission and Congress.269
Dissatisfied with the SEC's progress in banishing fixed commissions at the
stock exchanges, Congress intervened and forbade fixed commissions
through the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.270 And there is a second
additional player: the courts. However, even though the courts have the
final say, they often rely largely on the SEC's judgment.27 1
The powers by the SEC are not a theoretical threat; rather, the
Commission is omnipresent in the stock exchange's life. One will hardly
find an issue of the Federal Register without proposed stock exchange rule
changes, approvals, and so forth. Moreover, the SEC regularly brings
actions against stock exchanges. And, as will be discussed in the following
section, it does not flinch from taking on the biggest players, such as the
New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq.
3. Regulation by Stock Exchanges (Self-Regulatory Powers)
After the regulatory powers over stock exchanges, this section turns to
the regulatory powers of stock exchanges. These powers are critical for the
following discussion about demutualization, listing, and self-listing of stock
exchanges, because it is the regulatory powers of stock exchanges that
create various conflicts of interest if stock exchanges demutualize and go
public.
As self-regulatory organizations, stock exchanges bear a "front-line"
responsibility for regulation of their markets and for controlling their
265. Id. § 17(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1).
266. Id. § 17(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b).
267. For the stock exchanges as corporate governance trendsetters, see supra Part I.A.4.
268. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
269. See Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 679-81 (1975).
270. Securities Exchange Act § 6(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e).
271. See, e.g., Gordon, 422 U.S. at 686.
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members' compliance with the provisions to which they are subject. 272
Emphasizing the importance of the self-regulatory organizations to the
regulation of our securities markets, the SEC recently stated that the self-
regulatory organizations are "charged with an important public trust to carry
out their self-regulatory responsibilities effectively and fairly, while
fostering free and open markets, protecting investors, and promoting the
public trust. '273 In this context, it is important to note that self-regulation is
not a right granted to the stock exchanges, but rather a statutorily imposed
duty,274 leading to an obligation to regulate themselves. 275 This public
mandate is not only a privilege, but also an important cost factor for the
exchange. For instance, the New York Stock Exchange, as the nation's
largest stock exchange, employs more than seven hundred employees for
regulatory issues, some forty-five percent of its staff.276 If an entity fails to
expend the necessary resources and perform its regulatory function, it will
not be registered as a national securities exchange, and any previously
granted registration will be revoked.277
The scope of the stock exchange's self-regulation has been somewhat
neglected so far, which will presumably change when the conflicts of
interest in publicly traded stock exchanges draw more attention. We often
read that the stock exchanges' constituencies are subject to its regulatory
powers, particularly the stock exchanges' members and the listed issuers.
In a simplified way this notion is correct, and is the basis for the following
discussion, which distinguishes between powers over members and over
issuers. However, as will be discussed in more detail later, the power over
issuers is not a regulatory power in a literal sense, because its basis is not
the Securities Exchange Act and the rules thereunder, but rather the contract
between the stock exchange and the issuer (the so-called listing agreement).
This distinction is especially important for demutualized and publicly
traded stock exchanges.
a. Regulation of Members
Stock exchanges have both the power and the duty to enforce the
compliance of their members (the so-called seat holders) with the Securities
Exchange Act, the rules and regulations thereunder, and the stock
272. The term "front-line" is regularly used by the SEC. See Fair Administration and
Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50699, 69 Fed.
Reg. 71,126, 71,128, 71,129 n.30 (Dec. 8, 2004).
273. Id. at 71,129 (referring to Securities Exchange Act § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5)
(national stock exchanges) and Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
3(b)(6) (registered securities associations)).
274. See Securities Exchange Act § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (cataloging the obligations);
see also Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 353 (1963).
275. Silver, 373 U.S. at 356.
276. See NYSE Lays OffAbout 60 Workers, Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 2005, at C5 (noting that
none of 714 out of the remaining 1577 employees lost their jobs). See generally New York
Stock Exchange, http://www.nyse.com/regulation/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
277. Securities Exchange Act § 19(h)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1).
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exchanges' rules.278 The same rules apply to persons associated with the
stock exchanges' members. 279 While the stock exchanges' rulemaking
powers are limited, most importantly to matters related to the purposes of
the Securities Exchange Act and the administration of the stock
exchange,280 it is important to note that their surveillance and enforcement
powers over members are not. For example, the New York Stock Exchange
enforces the prospectus delivery duties that their members have under
federal securities law when they sell certain securities. 281
Within this scope, stock exchanges have the power and the obligation to
ensure that their members are reliable, both financially and in regard to their
conduct. Concerning the former, the regulation of the stock exchange
covers the entire financial and operating compliance of its members, such as
financial requirements set by the exchange. 282 Concerning the members'
conduct, stock exchanges have to enact rules that establish expectations for
"training, experience, and competence" on the part of brokers and dealers
that trade at the stock exchange. 283
In recent years, trust in the stock exchanges' willingness and ability to
regulate their members has seriously suffered. Recently, the SEC charged
the New York Stock Exchange for failing to police its specialists for a
period of almost four years. 284 In addition, the Commission instituted
enforcement actions against twenty specialists allegedly involved in the
violations, 285 after having settled enforcement actions against all seven
278. Id. § 6(b)(1), (5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(1), (5); id. § 19(g)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(g)(1)(A); see also Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-50700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,259 (Dec. 8, 2004); Fair Administration and
Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,131; Coffee & Seligman,
supra note 21, at 674.
279. See Securities Exchange Act § 19(g)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)(1)(A). The term
"person associated with a member" is defined in Securities Exchange Act § 3(21), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(21).
280. Id. § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5).
281. See Ann Davis, No Prospectus? NYSE Blames Brokerage Firms, Wall St. J., Nov.
16, 2004, at Cl.
282. Securities Exchange Act § 6(c)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(3)(A).
283. Id. § 6(c)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(3)(B).
284. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comrn'n, supra note 224 (stating that the New York
Stock Exchange violated Securities Exchange Act § 19(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g), Securities
Exchange Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b), and Rule 1 lb-1 thereunder (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1lb-1 (2005), NYSE Rule 92, and NYSE Rule 104.10); see also Aaron Lucchetti et
al., Current and Former Big Board Regulators Might Face Civil Charges, Wall St. J., Oct. 4,
2005, at C3; Aaron Lucchetti & Kara Scannell, Fifteen Indicted in NYSE Case, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 13, 2005, at Cl; Kara Scannell & Aaron Lucchetti, Ex-Specialists Face Indictment For
NYSE Deals, Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 2005, at Cl; Deborah Solomon et al., SEC Prepares to
Charge the NYSE, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at C3.
285. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Institutes Enforcement Action Against
20 Former New York Stock Exchange Specialists Alleging Pervasive Course of Fraudulent
Trading (Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-54.htm (alleging
violations of Securities Exchange Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), Securities Exchange Act
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), Rule lob-5 thereunder (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5,
Securities Exchange Act § 1 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b)), and Rule 1 lb-1 thereunder (codified
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specialist firms one year ago. 2 8 6 This failure of the New York Stock
Exchange in monitoring its members is not the first incident; similar
misconduct had occurred as recently as in 1999. 287 This time, the New
York Stock Exchange agreed to tighten significantly its oversight, for
example by videotaping the members' conduct.
b. Market Surveillance
Closely related to the regulation of the members is the market
surveillance carried on by the stock exchanges, because it is the members
who trade on the market. However, whereas the general member regulation
is directed toward the members' attributes and characteristics, market
surveillance is directed toward the members' behavior. The classic focuses
are insider trading and market manipulation, but there are numerous other
forms of misconduct that conflict with the mandate to provide fair trading
and treatment of investors. For instance, members of stock exchanges must
not trade ahead of any order of a nonmember. 288
c. Regulation of Issuers
Stock exchanges regulate issuers for two purposes: First, they create
rules to ensure that the stocks of the issuers can be reliably traded, and
second, they create rules to ensure that the stocks are worth trading, namely
that the issuers meet corporate governance standards. The first set of rules
aims at the quality of the trading, while the second set aims at the quality of
the traded stocks. In regard to the former, stock exchanges require minima
of stockholders, outstanding publicly traded shares, and market
capitalization necessary to have a liquid market in the stocks. 28 9 In regard
to the latter, stock exchanges demand minimum corporate governance
standards-stock exchanges act thereby as corporate governance
trendsetters, a function that was discussed at the beginning of this Article.
at 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 lb-1, NYSE Rule 92, NYSE Rule 104, NYSE Rule 123B, and NYSE
Rule 401).
286. See SIG Specialists, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-50076, 83 SEC Docket 1208
(July 26, 2004); Performance Specialist Group LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50075,
83 SEC Docket 1200 (July 26, 2004); Bear Wagner Specialists LLC, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-49498, 82 SEC Docket 1886 (Mar. 30, 2004); Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC Docket 1895 (Mar. 30, 2004); LaBranche & Co. LLC,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-49500, 82 SEC Docket 1903 (Mar. 30, 2004); Spear, Leeds &
Kellogg Specialists LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49501, 82 SEC Docket 1912 (Mar.
30, 2004); Van der Moolen Specialists USA, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49502, 82
SEC Docket 1920 (Mar. 30, 2004).
287. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-41574, 70 SEC Docket 106
(June 29, 1999).
288. See Securities Exchange Act § 1 l(a)(1)(G)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a)(l)(G)(ii). For an
example of investigations in this field, see Jed Horowitz, NYSE Bars A Former Specialist
For Failure to Cooperate in Probe, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 2004, at C6.
289. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., supra note 34, § 102.00.
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The problem with the regulation of issuers is that their duties do not
depend on the Securities Exchange Act, rules and regulations thereunder, or
on the stock exchange's rules, but rather on a contract between the stock
exchange and the issuer, the so-called listing agreement.290 Therefore,
stock exchanges have no regulatory power (in a literal sense) over
noncomplying issuers, but only the powers given in the listing agreement.
For instance, if an issuer does not comply with the listing rules, absent
special provisions in the listing agreement the stock exchange has no
remedy to fine the issuer. Rather, the stock exchange is limited to
admonishing and threatening to delist the issuer. This creates problems
when demutualized stock exchanges list their stocks on their own
market.291
For all kinds of regulation by the stock exchanges, it is important to
remember from earlier parts of this Article that the stock exchanges'
regulatory powers are often only the first layer of oversight. With respect to
many areas, the SEC has the power to intervene, mentioned above. For
instance, if issuers of securities fail to file the reports required under the
Securities Exchange Act,292 the Commission has powers to suspend trading
in such companies or even revoke the registration, which makes future
trading unlawful. 293 This prohibition affects the stock exchanges' member,
trading, and issuer regulation, or, put differently, all fields that are subject
to self-regulation.
In addition to the SEC, important regulatory functions are performed by
the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), the other main
self-regulatory organization. For instance, the NASD in 2004 barred 450
individuals from the securities industry and collected a record $102 million
in disciplinary fines, 294 increasing to $125.4 million in 2005,295 up from
$5.3 million one decade earlier. 296
With this regulatory system and the stock exchanges' role in mind, the
Article now turns to the conflicts of interest that arise when stock
exchanges demutualize and go public.
290. For an example of the basic structure of listing agreements, see id. §§ 901.01-05.
291. See infra Part III.E.2.
292. See Securities Exchange Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
293. The SEC has recently increased the use of such measures. See Judith Bums, SEC
Suspends Trading in Firms That Failed to Make Filings, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 2004, at C5; see
also Karen Richardson, Big Board Proposes Crackdown on Late Filers, Wall St. J., Feb. 11,
2005, at C3.
294. See NASD Collected Record Fines During 2004, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 2004, at C3.
295. See Aaron Lucchetti, Schapiro to Become NASD's Chief, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 2006,
at C3.
296. See NASD Enforcement Chief Plans Return to Private Law Practice, Wall St. J., Jan.
19, 2006, at C3.
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B. Regulating in General
The first concern related to the conduct of demutualized and publicly
traded stock exchanges is to what extent those companies will focus on
regulation in general, with the possibility that it might be either too great an
undertaking or fall short of expectations. The reason for that somewhat
hazy picture is that stock exchanges have so many constituencies and
interests that it might be hard to predict whom they might favor and whom
they might not.
After a brief overview of stock exchanges' constituencies,297 the
remaining sections will identify incentives both to under-regulate 298 and to
overregulate, 299 which will lead to the insight that the intensity and
thoroughness of general regulation is probably indifferent toward the
organizational structure of stock exchanges. 300
1. Constituencies of Stock Exchanges
As anyone who would serve distinct purposes and therefore different
masters, stock exchanges face a vast number of conflicts of interest. Our
society, including our law, is normally not very favorable to those conflicts,
and tries to develop devices to avoid them in advance rather than to
establish rules that help manage them. As the Supreme Court decisively
asserts, "[N]o man can serve two masters." 30 1  The Court's apodictic
language borrows here from the Bible, which says, "No-one can serve two
masters. Either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be
devoted to the one and despise the other."30 2 One might want to add that
this is especially true when one of those masters is oneself, so that the
choice is between pursuing one's own or another's interest-which leads to
the idea that no man shall pass judgment on his own causes, as stated at the
Article's beginning.
To what extent those principles will be tested in our context remains to
be seen. Demutualized and publicly traded stock exchanges, apart from
their critical public function, differ little from other businesses in their daily
challenges, because conflicts of interest are inherent to all businesses.
There are, as in any other company, four main constituencies that fight for
the largest share of the pie-the exchange's assets: stockholders, creditors,
employees, and customers. Before demutualization and going public, stock
exchanges differ from normal companies only in that the interests of
297. See infra Part III.B. 1.
298. See infra Part III.B.2.
299. See infra Part III.B.3.
300. See infra Part III.B.4.
301. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 595 n.14 (1994); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 196 n.50 (1963); United States v. Miss.
Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 550 n.14 (1961); Knights of Pythias v. Withers, 177
U.S. 260, 269 (1900). Justice Louis Brandeis famously echoed these words. See Brandeis,
supra note 2, at 56, 69, 198-99, 202.
302. Matthew 6:24.
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customers and owners are to some extent aligned, as long as the exchanges
are owned by their main customers, the broker-dealers. With
demutualization and going public, stock exchanges acquire only one other
constituency: investor-stockholders, whose sole interest is to get the
highest possible return on investment.
These stockholders can expect that the stock exchanges' management
does its best to serve the stockholders, rather than other stakeholders.
Recall the famous holding in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., stating that "[a]
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
attain that end .... ",303
Admittedly, such stockholder primacy is a source of controversy even
today.304 But, at least factually, the constraints by the stock markets let
management of publicly traded companies focus primarily on stockholder
value, 30 5 a fact that the stock exchanges themselves frankly admit.306 For
instance, the Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Ltd.'s chairman publicly
announced from its very beginning that its corporate aim is to operate "in
the best interests of its shareholders." 30 7
With ownership separated from the customers, then, we see one new
conflict within the exchanges: stockholders versus customers competing
for the corporation's profits, with customers demanding low prices, and
stockholders the opposite. Stock exchanges will have to please both,
because if they overly favor one, the other will be deterred and change to a
competitor (by trading on another marketplace or investing in another
company). To make things more complicated, the stock exchanges'
customers themselves have conflicting interests: Issuers want low listing
fees; traders want low trading fees; some customers might want a floor
303. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919). Concededly, its precedent is
questionable. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
304. For the classic statement for stockholder primacy, see A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931). For a classic statement of the
opposite view, see E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932). For a recent, brief overview of the current debate, see Lynn A.
Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1189
(2002).
305. See generally Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance:
Political Context, Corporate Impact 39-40, 43-46 (2003); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 264-66
(1977); Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman, What Is Corporate Law, in The Anatomy
of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach 17-19 (Reinier R. Kraakman et
al. eds., 2004).
306. Press Release, ASX, supra note 54; see also World Org. of Exchs., The Significance
of the Exchange Industry 2 (5th ed. 2004).
307. Press Release, HKEx, supra note 214. This statement seems to conflict somewhat
with the legally imposed mandate to prefer public goals in a conflict of interests. See Carson,
supra note 8, at 12, 20.
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(particularly those who work on it), while others might prefer an automated
trading system.
It is important to note, however, that these conflicts are not limited to
publicly traded stock exchanges. Every company with owners different
from its customers faces this challenge to the same extent. The reason that
we are particularly aware of this conflict in the case of publicly traded stock
exchanges is only that, for stock exchanges, it is a new conflict. Although
observers should be aware of the initial differences, the conflict is nothing
regulators or commentators should be concerned about in the long term.
Management will work to find the right approach to handle it, as it does in
any other listed company.
Nonetheless, with the regulatory functions that are conferred on the stock
exchanges, they have an additional, important constituency: the public.
Although the public might have a stake in all companies, for tax,
employment, and reputational reasons, in the case of stock exchanges there
is considerably more, as marketplaces for stock have a critical
macroeconomic function: They match suppliers of capital with companies
that demand capital. Without well-organized and efficient markets,
companies will have difficulties finding capital to finance their business,
which would raise capital costs and impede the entire economy. From the
perspective of the capital suppliers, stock exchanges are important because
they provide for lucrative investments and simple risk diversification. Last
but not least, major parts of our pension system depend on a functioning
stock market. For all these reasons, stock exchanges are widely recognized
as a public good.30 8 As Congress wrote into the Securities Exchange Act in
1975, "The securities markets are an important national asset which must be
preserved and strengthened. '30 9 To the extent that preserving this national
asset creates costs for the exchange without increasing shareholder value,
there is a worrisome conflict of interest in the stock exchanges'
management. Or, as the Bible says following the last quotation, "You
cannot serve both God and mammon."310
With that in mind, we turn now to the incentives demutualized and
publicly traded stock exchanges might have to under-regulate or
overregulate their markets.
308. See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 349 (1963) ("Stock exchanges
perform an important function in the economic life of this country."); see also World Org. of
Exchs., supra note 306, at 6; Carson, supra note 8, at 1; JOSCO on Exchange
Demutualization, supra note 7, at 10.
309. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 1 lA(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(A)
(2000); see also id. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (commencing with, "For the reasons hereinafter
enumerated, transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges
and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest ....
310. Matthew 6:24.
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2. Incentives for Under-Regulation
There are a couple of reasons why we might expect demutualized for-
profit exchanges to under-regulate their markets. All these reasons are
related to the obvious notion that such exchanges will try to maximize their
profits, as every publicly traded company does.
Under this standard, each expense will be scrutinized in terms of whether
it will help increase profits, and our concern is that this scrutiny will include
regulatory expenses, which generate little, if any, direct income in the short
term. In the world of quarterly reports and short-dated executive
compensation, stock exchange managers might forget that they trade not
only stocks but also trust, and could be tempted to reduce regulation
expenses just to increase profits, an incentive that would include all types of
regulation. And the temptation would be significant: as already mentioned,
at the New York Stock Exchange, for instance, some forty-five percent of
the employees are working for the regulatory arm, 311 i.e., well-paid
investigators and lawyers, where cutting workforce would immediately lead
to huge savings. In 2004, for instance, the New York Stock Exchange
increased its budget for enforcement and market surveillance by $50
million,312 equaling the exchange's profit in the previous year.313 In other
words, the New York Stock Exchange could have doubled profits by not
spending so much extra on regulation. The unsurprising result was that in
the next year, the New York Stock Exchange's profit plummeted to its
lowest level since 1991.314 As this anecdotal evidence reveals, regulatory
expenses are nothing that exchanges would neglect under a pure profit-
maximizing standard. The concerns of under-regulation would be further
increased in situations where the choice is not between higher or lower
profits but between losses and regulation: Would stock exchanges
withstand the temptation to cut regulatory expenses when they are under
financial pressure and facing bankruptcy?
Another reasonable incentive for general under-regulation might be the
attracting of new customers and the pleasing of current ones. Under
pressure by the stockholders to turn a profit, stock exchanges may be
reluctant to take action against traders who are "good customers" and who
generate significant income for the exchange, 315 a problem that might have
increased with the ongoing consolidation in the industry. 316 Concededly,
stock exchanges may be similarly reluctant under the traditional mutual
structure, as then those "good customers" are its owners. Related to the last
311. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
312. Der Hovanesian, supra note 85. For the tightened oversight and increased regulatory
expenses, see Ceron & Lucchetti, supra note 94; Davis, supra note 281; Jed Horowitz, NYSE
Posts Loss as Legal Costs Rise and Trading Volume Slips, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 2004, at C3.
313. NYSE, Inc., supra note 43, at 32.
314. Ceron & Lucchetti, supra note 94.
315. See generally, IOSCO on Exchange Demutualization, supra note 7, at 7.
316. See Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
50700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,259-60, 71,262 (Dec. 8, 2004).
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concern is the worry that stock exchanges may be hesitant to suspend
trading in heavily traded stocks of noncomplying issuers, issuers that are
the "blockbusters" and "cash cows" of the stock exchange, because
exchanges charge transaction fees according to the amount of traded stocks;
or, earlier in the process of issuer regulation, that stock exchanges may
admit securities that they expect to be heavily traded, regardless of whether
the issuer fulfills the listing requirements or not. History has already
revealed such a habit of leniency toward issuers: The American Stock
Exchange traditionally attracted issuers that failed to comply with the New
York Stock Exchange's listing rules. A recent study by the General
Accounting Office discovered that more than twenty percent of the new
listings at the American Stock Exchange in the examined period did not
meet the American Stock Exchange's own listing standards. 317 And even
the New York Stock Exchange has recently been accused of exempting an
issuer just because it is a big player,318 in addition to the classic Business
Roundtable case where the big board eased its requirements so as to allow
General Motors to list another class of stocks.319
Another, although not-so-plausible fear is that stock exchanges might be
reluctant to enforce corporate governance listing standards that the
exchanges themselves do not comply with. For instance, stock exchanges
might ignore impermissible poison pills, because they have comparable
ones of their own. 320 Such conflicts, however, in any case limited to issuer
regulation, seem not so likely. Even if the stock exchange does not want to
apply certain standards to itself, such an exchange probably will not flinch
from applying double standards and enforcing listing standards that the
stock exchange itself ignores. The risk that issuers would publicly point
fingers at the stock exchange when it applies standards to them that it does
not apply to itself is probably not that high, considering the powers of the
stock exchange over the issuers and the opportunities to damage the issuer's
reputation.
3. Incentives for Overregulation
There are also incentives for over-regulation. Under the traditional
framework, stock exchanges have powers to levy fines against persons and
entities that do not comply with the law, including rules set by the stock
317. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Securities Regulation: Improvements Needed in the
Amex Listing Program 3 (2001).
318. See Jesse Eisinger, Santander-Sovereign Deal Gives NYSE A Shot at Proving Its
Policing Prowess, Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 2005, at C1; see also Phyllis Plitch, NYSE Deadline
Stance Softens With Proposal, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 2005, at C3 (discussing a controversial
rule change that would exempt Fannie Mae from the New York Stock Exchange's normal
delisting procedures).
319. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
320. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares, supra note 11, at 422. Defensive tactics for
takeovers ("poison pills") are governed by the exchanges. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., supra note
34, §§ 308, 312.03. For an overview of demutualized markets' poison pills, see Bradley,
supra note 11, at 698-99.
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exchanges. As the fines and other kinds of payments go directly into the
stock exchange's pockets, for-profit stock exchanges might be tempted to
overregulate and increase the number as well as the amount of the fines, as
long as the additional revenue outweighs the regulatory expenses.
Although there may be a positive effect from seeing regulation as an
income source, as it might provide stock exchanges with an incentive to
thoroughly regulate, it would seem problematic to give entities regulatory
powers to impose fines that are to the benefit of the entity's stockholders,
because enforcement action would no longer be driven by regulatory
purposes but rather by financial goals. The effect would be increased
further if the compensation of management and particularly of the
regulatory staff is linked to the stock exchange's performance. 321 Such a
link, which is an important and usually reasonable corporate governance
tool to constrain management, 322 increases the incentives of the responsible
personnel to overregulate, regardless of the stock exchange's general
policy.
At least this is the theory; in practice, fines are anything but a reliable
source of income, as fined persons can and probably will challenge the
stock exchange's decision, which creates enormous costs for the stock
exchange, for legal advice and opinions, that offset any profit gained from
the fines. One might argue that fined persons might not dare to challenge
the fine, as this creates bad publicity and the challenging person risks being
even more intensively regulated in the future. However, both arguments are
weak. First, a person already fined has little reputation to lose, if there is
any good reputation left at all. Second, the risk of being more intensively
regulated is most likely negligible in this context. As the stock exchange
will in most cases not make any profits with challenged fines, due to the
expenditures, the exchange is unlikely to overregulate again.
4. The Organizational Structures' Indifference Toward Regulation
Until this point, we could identify incentives both for under-regulation
and over-regulation, though the latter being not as promising as a source of
income, which would suggest that our main concern would be whether
demutualized for-profit exchanges will be tempted to under-regulate, either
the overall market or good customers.
In the short term, that might seem promising, whereas in the long term,
trust will be the core asset of any marketplace to attract traders and issuers,
a classical problem that calls to mind the discussion of whether state
competition for corporate charters leads to a "race to the bottom" or a "race
321. For this concern, see Carson, supra note 8, at 14.
322. See generally Roe, supra note 305, at 41-43; Henry Hansmann & Reinier H.
Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategy, in The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A
Comparative and Functional Approach, supra note 305, at 26-27, 51-52.
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to the top," if there is a race at all. 323 Though the issues derive from two
different contexts, the basic argumentation might be similar, with the
following distinction: There is a considerable risk that the first corporate
scandal might occur as early as the next quarter, with the not so unlikely
threat of ousting the current management that decided to under-regulate. It
is like an airline saving money by cutting costs for airplane maintenance
and security. You can be lucky for a couple of years, but in any case, the
first crashed airplane costs the entire business, including management, as no
one will ever fly with that airline again, at least not under the same name
(remember ValuJet). 324
It is pretty much the same for stock markets: As soon as investors realize
that issuer regulation is lenient and fair price discovery no longer
guaranteed, they will switch to another marketplace, which stands ready to
fill the gap. Demutualization does not change anything in that regard, as
evidenced by a statement by the chairman of the Board of the Pacific
Exchange: "Lose [investors'] confidence and it matters little whether
you're trading on a floor or in front of a screen, through a member
organization or a private or public corporation." 325 Pacific Exchange's
Chairman went on to say that "[n]othing-nothing-is as essential to our
ongoing viability-as an industry or an exchange-as public
confidence." 326
In addition, stock exchanges are a heavily regulated industry.
Demutualization and listing does not lessen any of the numerous
obligations of the Securities Exchange Act and the rules thereunder. It is
the stock exchanges that demutualize and start working for-profit, not the
SEC, which will enforce the law as vigorously as before, maybe with even
more attention to publicly traded stock exchanges.
And finally, the incentive to under-regulate is not necessarily greater for
publicly traded stock exchanges than for the traditionally organized
exchanges. 327 The underlying idea for that assumption is that, to the extent
that the stock exchanges' profits depend on properly regulated markets, the
interests of the stock exchanges' shareholders might be more aligned with
macroeconomic goals than under the current system. For instance, broker-
323. For the view that the competition among the states is a race to the bottom, see
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.
J. 663 (1974), and more recently, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 1437 (1992). For the opposite view (race to the top), see Roberta Romano, The Genius
of American Corporate Law (1993), and Winter, supra note 305, at 254-62. However, some
commentators question whether there is a race at all. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The
Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679 (2002).
324. After the crash of one of its airplanes into the Everglades in 1996, ValuJet merged
with the much smaller AirTran, under which it still operates.
325. Greber, supra note 141.
326. Id.
327. See Steil, supra note 11, at 72-77 (arguing that demutualization might reduce
conflicts of interest).
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dealers as the traditional owners of stock exchanges may profit from a
loosely supervised market, because it enables them to defraud investors.
Those fraud profits can easily outweigh the proportional loss they incur
because of the decline of the stock exchange's value.
On balance, there do exist incentives for stock exchanges to overregulate
and (perhaps more often) to under-regulate. Nevertheless, there are good
reasons to believe that stock exchanges will, in general, not change their
regulatory policy if they demutualize and go public. Instead, the
organizational structure seems to be largely indifferent toward the general
quality of regulation. In this light, there is no need to impose an additional
duty on the stock exchange's management to favor the public's interests
over the stockholders' interests. 328 Apart from the lack of enforceability of
such a rule, it is neither necessary nor desirable. On the contrary, such a
rule would give management a good excuse for any misconduct 329 -the
contention that they acted in the public interest is hard to reject, as the
public interest is subject to different interpretations.
Therefore, although there might be some tensions between for-profit
stock exchanges and their public mandate, which the SEC may be all too
aware of,3 3 0 these tensions are nothing that needs regulatory or legislative
action.
C. Regulating Stockholders
Noteworthy and worrisome conflicts of interest arise when stock
exchanges regulate their stockholders. That scenario is likely, since many
investors that are expected to buy into stock exchanges are subject to
regulation by stock exchanges.
To begin with, the former members as the owners of the stock exchange
will get the first shares when the stock exchange demutualizes, 331 and
thereby keep their control over the stock exchange's management. Even if
additional shares are being offered to the public, either as part of the going
public or in a second offering, broker-dealers will retain a significant share
328. Such provisions were enacted in Hong Kong and in Singapore. See Carson, supra
note 8, at 12, 20.
329. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 38 (1991); Paul Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Control Transactions, in The
Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, supra note 305, at
188; Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization,
149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2063, 2065 (2001).
330. Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-50699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,132 (Dec. 8, 2004). See generally
Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50700, 69 Fed.
Reg. 71,256 (Dec. 8, 2004).
331. In the case of the New York Stock Exchange, see Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE Deal
Treats Insiders Unequally, Wall St. J., May 11, 2005, at C3; Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE to Ease
Restrictions On Members' Sales of Shares, Wall St. J., May 12, 2005, at C6. For the Stock
Exchange of Hong Kong, see Press Release, HKEx, The Merger Proposals for the Stock and
Futures Exchanges and the Clearing Houses Take Effect (Mar. 6, 2000), available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/0306news.htm.
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in the stock exchange that could allow them to influence the stock
exchange's policies, theoretically to make management be lenient toward
them. But this concern should not loom too large: First, with many of them
in financial need and looking for capital to invest in new technologies, the
share of members in the exchange will probably sink over time, as mainly
non-broker-dealers will buy the offered shares. Second, and this is
probably the most important reason, their position as stockholders is much
weaker than as members, so demutualization reduces the threat of undue
member influence rather than increasing it. And last but not least, as for all
conflicts, demutualization and listing do not affect the stock exchange's
obligations under the Securities Exchange Act and the oversight by the SEC
thereunder. It is therefore not likely that publicly traded stock exchanges
generally will under-regulate their members. (The arguments of the
previous section against general under-regulation also apply.)
Matters change if the issue is not about the regulation of the broker-
dealers in general, but about one or a few broker-dealers with a huge share.
We can extend this to regulated issuers that hold large shares, such as listed
financial holding companies. Let us assume that such a regulated broker-
dealer or issuer holds thirty percent of the stock exchange. Now,
management is in a significant personal conflict of interest, because if
management displeases this major stockholder, its days are numbered. This
leads to a material conflict of interest, one whose dimension is entirely
different from a conflict over whether the stock exchange could be tempted
to under-regulate good customers: First of all, customers are unlikely to
have a share in revenues as large as stockholders have in the exchange's
equity. Second, displeasing customers threatens management only
indirectly, if at all. Displeasing controlling stockholders, on the other hand,
creates a direct threat to management, as this shareholder might use the very
next chance to oust them.
In this constellation, the watchful eyes of the SEC and the market (both
of which know of the large stockholder due to reporting requirements)
would not be sufficient to mitigate the conflict, that is to avoid the risk of
under-regulation of large stockholders, as outsiders can only see what is
presented to them. But whether the stockholders get special treatment such
as extended deadlines or favorable surveillance is not always visible to
someone who is not on-site.
One of the proposals to mitigate conflicts of that type is to set forth
restrictions and limits for ownership in stock exchanges. 332 As explained
later, such strict ownership rules would not be good policy, because they
might prevent ownership structures that are desirable both from a regulatory
and a competitive standpoint.333  Under the regime that this Article
proposes, there would not be such a conflict of interest at all, because the
332. See Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 71,143-46.
333. See infra Part IV.C.
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regulatory arm of the stock exchanges would report to the SEC and not to
management. 334 Management would have no influence over the regulation
of stockholders, with the consequence that large stockholders would not
have a reason to threaten and to oust them, as a new management could not
do anything about it either.
D. Regulating Competitors
Significant conflicts of interest arise whenever stock exchanges regulate
competitors and thereby, as stated at the outset of this Article, pass
judgment on a competitor's cause, the constellation that we should probably
be most worried about. Although the conflicts that arise with regulating
competitors also occur in cases of mutual stock exchanges (because such
exchanges also want to maintain or improve their competitive position), the
pressure of stockholders to deliver profits may boost the incentive to treat
rivals unfairly, and the tendency of for-profit exchanges to expand their
businesses may create more opportunities for discrimination than would
exist in a traditional stock exchange.
Stock exchanges have plenty of ways to treat competitors unfairly, such
as by delaying regulatory decisions, imposing unjustified sanctions,
excessive fees and fines, and, generally, by exaggerating surveillance.
Especially in the case of competing issuers, halting the trading in stocks of
a competitor for an unreasonable period of time or without reasons may be
quite damaging. 335 That the competitors can appeal such actions and sue
the stock exchange is no adequate remedy, as it will often be very difficult
to prove the stock exchange's bad motivations, especially in the many cases
where stock exchanges have broad discretion. Moreover, it is probably not
a good idea to sue the exchange, considering the bad publicity that comes
with the lawsuit regardless of its outcome. Last, but not least, threatening
to leave the exchange will only be an option in a few cases, as there often
will be no adequate, alternative marketplace. Consequently, in most cases,
competitors will be almost unprotected against the stock exchange's
conduct. Opportunities to discriminate against competitors can be observed
both in the context of trading regulation, 336 as well as for issuer
regulation. 337
1. Trading Regulation
Any broker-dealer that competes for listings or transactions will bring the
stock exchange that regulates the broker-dealer into significant conflicts of
interest. One of the most common areas for such conflicts may be broker-
dealers that engage in in-house crossing, i.e., that match orders without
334. See infra Part IV.B.2.
335. For the power to halt trading, see, e.g., NYSE, Inc., supra note 34, § 202.07.
336. See infra Part III.D.l.
337. See infra Part lII.D.2.
25992006]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
routing them through the national market system, or organize other markets
that compete with the stock exchange. Stock exchanges have considerable
incentives here for unfair regulation, and the SEC has already been faced
with such a case.338
Aside from stock exchange members that happen to organize a
competing market, there might be conflicts with organizers that normally
would not be interested in being a member of a stock exchange, but that are
nonetheless driven into the stock exchange's hands as a consequence of the
regulatory environment. Under the SEC's Regulation ATS, organizers of
alternative marketplaces can choose whether they want to be regulated as
national securities exchanges or as broker-dealers. 339 The rationale behind
this requirement is to provide for an oversight of alternative trading systems
within the traditional regulatory framework, without the need to establish a
regulatory framework just for that type of market organizer. If they opt to
become regulated as broker-dealers, alternative trading systems are required
to become members of a self-regulatory organization, 340 which means in
practice either the NASD or a national securities exchange. If an alternative
trading system-for whatever reason-does not want to be subject to
NASD regulation, its only option is to become a member of a national
securities exchange, which creates the opportunities for unfair treatment
that are the subject of this section.
Recent history gives us a good example (although the story finally ended
in a different way): Nasdaq was, at least temporarily, thinking about
leasing a seat at the New York Stock Exchange, 34 1 as the SEC saw
insurmountable conflicts of interest if the NASD, Nasdaq's former parent
company, continued supervising Nasdaq. 342 As a lessee at the New York
Stock Exchange, however, Nasdaq would have been subject to the New
York Stock Exchange's broker-dealer regulation, which would have
allowed Nasdaq to cut all ties with the NASD. Changing from the NASD,
however, to the New York Stock Exchange might have been like jumping
out of the frying pan and into the fire. From a regulatory standpoint, the
Nasdaq Stock Market probably would have been better regulated by the
New York Stock Exchange than by the then-partisan NASD; from a
competitive standpoint, however, such a move would have been quite
questionable.
338. Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50700,
69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,262 (Dec. 8, 2004).
339. Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-50699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,130-31 (Dec. 8, 2004).
340. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2000).
341. See Aaron Lucchetti, Nasdaq, Snapping Up a Bargain, Leases NYSE Seat For Brut
Unit, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 2005, at C3.
342. See id.
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2. Issuer Regulation
The potential conflicts of interest caused by the regulation of competitors
are even greater with respect to issuers. Whereas the number and the
business scope of broker-dealers is naturally and by law limited, issuers that
are listed on a stock exchange can be engaged in any type of business. This
means that there can be issuers competing in all the businesses that the
stock exchange itself is engaged in.
To the extent that demutualized U.S. stock exchanges expand their
business (e.g., into derivatives trading, clearing, settlement, index services)
the opportunities for unfair issuer regulation will increase dramatically.
Europe might offer here a glimpse into the future, with Deutsche Btrse
probably being the best example. According to its investor relations
website,
Deutsche B6rse AG is far more than a German stock exchange-it is a
transaction service provider which affords companies and investors access
to the global capital markets by means of advanced technology. With its
product and service portfolio, covering the entire process chain from front
to back office of its customers, Deutsche Btrse has a far wider basis than
all its competitors. 343
With each additional business sector, there will be more competitors, and
more conflicts of interests.
Nasdaq listed on the New York Stock Exchange is only the easiest and
most obvious example in this category. Australia has seen a more complex
constellation in the takeover battle for the Sydney Futures Exchange, 344 a
case that nicely illustrates the potential conflicts. The Australian Stock
Exchange, then already a demutualized and self-listed stock exchange,
made a bid for the Sydney Futures Exchange, a derivatives market. 345 So
343. Deutsche Borse Group, Investor Relations, http://deutsche-
boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/en/kir/gdbnavigation/investorrelations? (last visited Feb. 25,
2006).
344. See IOSCO on Exchange Demutualization, supra note 7, at 16-17. For general
information about the Sydney Futures Exchange, see Sydney Futures Exchange,
http://www.sfe.com.au (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
345. Press Release, ASX, ASX and SFE (Dec. 22, 1998), available at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA221298bAS3.htm; Press
Release, ASX, ASX & SFE Merger (Aug. 3, 1999), available at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA030899_AS3.htm [hereinafter
Press Release, ASX & SFE Merger]; Press Release, ASX, ASX & SFE Merger (July 29,
1999), available at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA290799_AS3.htm; Press
Release, ASX, ASX and SFE Merger (June 17, 1999), available at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA170699aAS3.htm; Press
Release, ASX, ASX & SFE Merger (May 19, 1999), available at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA190599_AS3.htm [hereinafter
Press Release, ASX & SFE Merger 2]; Press Release, ASX, ASX & SFE Merger-Progress
Report (Feb. 19, 1999), available at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA190299_AS3.htm; Press
Release, ASX, ASX and SFE Merger Proposal (Apr. 27, 1999), available at
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did Computershare Ltd., a company that offers share registry and provides
financial market services. 346 A problem arose because Computershare Ltd.
was (and still is) listed on the Australian Stock Exchange and therefore was
subject to its regulatory powers. In other words, a stock exchange was
competing with one of its regulated issuers for the takeover of a third
company, a conflict of interest that the affected parties took very seriously.
Finally, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (the
Australian Stock Exchange's regulator), the Australian Stock Exchange,
and Computershare Ltd. entered into an agreement that addressed the
conflict of interest. 347  Under this arrangement, the Australian Stock
Exchange was, for the period of the takeover battle, forced to consult with
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission before making any
regulatory decision as to the listing of Computershare. 348 Eventually, for
reasons that are not relevant here, neither acquired the Sydney Futures
Exchange. 349
However, the story gives us a further example of the possible conflicts:
The Sydney Futures Exchange itself subsequently went public, and has
been listed on the Australian Stock Exchange since April 2002. The
problem here is that the Australian Stock Exchange, notwithstanding its
failed takeover, also organizes a market for derivatives, and in this regard
competes with the Sydney Futures Exchange. To avoid conflicts of interest
with regard to Computershare and other competitors, the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission was empowered to step in and
perform the functions that are normally conferred upon the Australian Stock
Exchange. 350
Although the United States is late in the process of demutualization and
listing of stock exchanges, there are already some early problems. For
instance, the Pacific Exchange, then part of Archipelago, traded options on
http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA270499_AS3.htm; Press
Release, ASX, ASX Announces Revised $260 Million SFE Merger Proposal (June 11,
1999), available at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA 110699_AS3.htm; Press
Release, ASX, Merger Proposal (June 3, 1999), available at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA030699_AS3.htm [hereinafter
Press Release, Merger Proposal]; Press Release, ASX, Merger Proposal (May 25, 1999),
available at http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA250599_AS3.htm.
346. For general information, see Computershare, http://www.computershare.com.au (last
visited Feb. 25, 2006). For the responses of the Australian Stock Exchange to
Computershare's bid, see Press Release, ASX & SFE Merger 2, supra note 345; Press
Release, Merger Proposal, supra note 345; Press Release, ASX & SFE Merger, supra note
345.
347. Press Release, ASX, ASIC/ASX/Computershare Agreement (May 28, 1999),
available at http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA280599_AS3.htm.
348. See id.
349. For the withdrawal of the Australian Stock Exchange, see Press Release, ASX, ASX
& SFE Merger (Aug. 13, 1999), available at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/shareholder/announcements/AA 130899_AS3.htm.
350. Carson, supra note 8, at 16.
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Instinet,351 the alternative trading system that was competing with the
Pacific Exchange's and Archipelago's stock market. Admittedly, the
possible conflicts of interest in the supervision of the trade in options are
smaller than in the case of stocks, but there are some possibilities for unfair
influence. Furthermore, Instinet was traded on the Nasdaq Stock Market,
again a competitor, which ultimately bought Instinet.
Under the regime that this Article proposes, such conflicts would be
mitigated by separating the stock exchange's regulatory arm from its
business operations, so that management has no opportunity to discriminate
against competitors.
E. Regulating Oneself
When stock exchanges demutualize and go public, they have to make
another fundamental decision: Where should the exchange's own stocks be
traded, i.e., on which market should the exchange itself be listed? Consider
the New York Stock Exchange as an example: Now that it has become a
publicly traded company, called NYSE Group Inc., where should its stocks
be traded?
The answer seems obvious-predominantly on its own market. Just as
auto producers use their own cars on their premises, airline employees their
own flight connections, and computer producers their own laptops, so can
stock exchanges use their own markets to list their shares. And-not
surprisingly-all demutualized stock exchanges have listed their stock or
the stock of their holding companies on their own markets, usually referred
to as self-listing.352 Examples of self-listing include Archipelago and
Nasdaq (although before it became a stock exchange) as well as the
Australian Stock Exchange, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Deutsche
B6rse), Euronext N.V., the London Stock Exchange, OMX Group, and the
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing
Limited).
Self-listing raises questions as to whether the stock exchange will be
impartial enough to apply the regulatory framework to itself the same way
it does to others. This question leads back to the notion expressed in the
first paragraph of this Article: No one shall judge in her own cause.
Like previous parts, the following discussion distinguishes between
conflicts that arise in the context of trading regulation 353 and issuer
regulation. 354
351. The trading began in 2001. See Press Release, Pac. Exch., Pacific Exchange to Trade
Options on Instinet Group Incorporated and USEC, Inc. (May 30, 2001), available at
http://www.pacificex.com/news/press/press-2001/optpress_01 instinet-usec.html.
352. IOSCO on Exchange Demutualization, supra note 7, at 8; Fair Administration and
Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50699, 69 Fed.
Reg. 71,126, 71,132, 71,151 (Dec. 8, 2004).
353. See infra Part IlI.E.1.
354. See infra Part III.E.2.
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1. Trading Regulation
The first set of conflicts of interest arises in the regulation of the trading
in the stock exchange's stock. These conflicts are related to two separate
regulatory powers of stock exchanges: the power over the broker-dealers
and the power over the trading as a whole, known as market surveillance.
Stock exchanges might misuse their broad powers over broker-dealers in
order to influence positively the trade in their own stocks, e.g., by
apparently increasing the trading volume through "wash sales," 355 by
measures to artificially stabilize the price, or by discouraging trading
practices that are presumed to have negative impacts on the stock price,
such as short sales. Most susceptible to undue influence by the stock
exchange is probably the specialist that oversees the trading in the stock
exchange's stocks, because this particular broker-dealer is not only subject
to the stock exchange's regulation, but can also be influenced by the stock
exchange's management if the latter threatens to choose another specialist
(an option, concededly, that is open to any issuer). 356
Among the general powers of stock exchanges over the market, one
might think that the stock exchanges' authority to halt, delay, and resume
the trading in stocks might be troublesome, especially with regard to
companies that have material news pending. 357 These powers seem to give
opportunities for self-preferential treatment, for example if the stock
exchange's management delays a halt in the trading of their stocks so that
they can sell (bad news) or buy (good news) in advance of the news release.
Such conduct, however, is not limited to publicly traded stock exchanges;
any member of management can commit such securities fraud (to give it a
proper name) by not disclosing the information to the stock exchange, and
trading to its own advantage.
More worrisome is probably the authority to decide on delistings, 358 an
area where the stock exchange's power can be based on both the listing
rules359 and the trading rules.360 Limiting the discussion here on the latter,
stock exchanges may refrain from delisting their shares even though their
trading rules require it, most importantly because the trading volume is too
low. The risk of unfair decision is increased in this area by the wide
discretion that stock exchanges have in delisting decisions.361
355. Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 71,151.
356. For the New York Stock Exchange's specialist, see NYSE Chooses Bear Wagner as
Its Specialist, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 2006, at B13.
357. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., supra note 34, § 202.07.
358. For a comprehensive overview, see Jonathan Macey et al., Down and Out in the
Stock Market: The Law and Economics of the Delisting Process (Apr. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=583401.
359. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., supra note 34, § 801.00.
360. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Rule 499 (removed and rescinded as of May 5, 2005).
361. See, e.g., id. Rule 499.10 (removed and rescinded as of May 5, 2005).
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None of the conflicts discussed in this subsection arise when the stock
exchanges' regulatory arm is separated and reports to the SEC, as proposed
later herein.
2. Issuer Regulation
Conflicts related to the issuer regulation of self-listed stock exchanges
are the core problem of self-listing, and they will not be solved just by
separating the regulatory arm.
As explained earlier, issuer regulation is based on listing agreements into
which the stock exchanges enter with the issuers.362 Such agreements lay
down the whole set of I'sting requirements with which issuers have to
comply when they are listed on the stock exchange, not only for the initial
listing process but on an ongoing basis (even though the powers of stock
exchanges to enforce the listing rules are not regulatory powers in a literal
meaning, but based solely on the contract with the issuer).
For several reasons, listing requirements for self-listed stock exchanges
cannot be governed by traditional listing agreements. So far, commentators
have questioned whether stock exchanges will "negotiate listing agreements
with themselves and then supervise continuing compliance with such
agreements." 363 Those concerns that the stock exchanges will not honor the
listing agreements are probably warranted, but perhaps on slightly different
grounds. Stock exchanges cannot enter into listing agreements with
themselves, because no one can make a contract with oneself. It does not
work. You cannot establish a claim against yourself. Of course, that is a
very technical aspect, a problem that might be easy to solve. For example,
stock exchanges might publicly announce that they are bound to their listing
rules, so that they will be constrained by public scrutiny to follow those
rules, instead of following a contractual obligation. But there remain a
couple of problems that are not so easy to overcome. To begin with, a
considerable number of listing rules are subject to individual negotiation.
That is why parties normally enter into individual listing agreements instead
of using the same set of rules for all issuers. Who is going to "negotiate"
them? While we sometimes engage in spirited debates over transactions
that might or might not be entered into at arm's length, this is a situation
here where only one arm is involved, so to speak.
Even if we overcome all those procedural problems, there remains one
substantive point, the core problem: Most of the normal listing rules would,
literally applied to stock exchanges, not make any sense. Why should the
stock exchange, as an issuer, submit annual and interim reports to itself, the
stock exchange as the regulator?364 Why should the stock exchange, as
issuer, give notice about important developments to itself, as the
362. For an example of the basic structure of listing agreements, see NYSE, Inc., supra
note 34, § 901.01-.05. For an overview of issuer regulation, see supra Part III.A.3.
363. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares, supra note 11, at 421.
364. For this obligation, see, e.g., NYSE, Inc., supra note 34, § 203.00.
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regulator?365 There are dozens of such notice obligations, particularly for
charter and by-laws amendments 366 and various material changes, such as
with regard to directors and officers, 367 the auditor,368 or the business
purpose. 369 All these reporting requirements make sense if the issuer is not
the stock exchange. But reporting to oneself is like a soliloquy, even if
there is some sort of separation. Is there any sense in reporting a change of
directors within the same company? Is there any benefit in delivering the
annual report from one department to another?
It is important to note that, unlike in other contexts, the question here is
not whether we can trust the stock exchanges to examine their own reports
as thoroughly as the reports of the other issuers. Much of the benefit gained
from reporting requirements is connected to the fact that material
information gets from inside the company to outsiders, people who are not
in any way affiliated with the company, so that an outsider puts a watchful
eye on the information. All that is lost if a stock exchange reports to itself.
Not so important are the problems that arise with respect to listing fees,
which are normally part of the listing agreement.370 At first view, it might
raise competitive concerns if the stock exchange charges its competitors
higher fees than it charges itself. But at a closer look, it does not matter
what fees the stock exchange itself pays because they are merely transferred
from the left pocket into the right pocket. From a regulatory and a
competitive viewpoint, self-listing fees do not matter (although they might
from an accounting and tax viewpoint).
Last but not least, regulatory concerns arise in the context of the
termination of the listing. Stock exchanges have the power at any time to
suspend listed stocks from dealing ("delisting"). As already mentioned, this
power has two foundations: It can be based on both the listing rules 371 and
the trading rules. 372 Stock exchanges may be tempted to allow themselves
an easy way to delist that is not available for other issuers. 373
On balance, the usual listing agreement regime does not work for self-
listed stock exchanges. Since the main reason for that is the lack of outside
control, any proposal to tighten the requirements placed on stock exchanges
when regulating themselves misses the point. Instead, later parts of this
Article put forward the idea of mandatory dual listing for stock exchanges.
Implementing this would allow a competent outsider, another stock
exchange, to have a closer look at the exchange. And there is no concern
365. See, e.g., id. §§ 204.00-.33.
366. See, e.g., id. § 204.03.
367. See, e.g., id. § 204.14.
368. See, e.g., id. § 204.05.
369. See, e.g., id. § 204.06.
370. See, e.g., id. §§ 701.02, 902.00.
371. See, e.g., id. § 801.00.
372. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Rule 499 (removed and rescinded as of May 5, 2005).
373. Cf Fleckner, supra note 175, at 16-17 (discussing the problems of foreign issuers
leaving the U.S. securities markets, which requires not only delisting but also deregistration).
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about bias-under the proposed regime, the regulatory arm of the other
stock exchange would report to the SEC if it is itself a publicly traded stock
exchange.
F. Regulating Affiliates
A variant of the foregoing problems is the regulation of affiliates of the
stock exchange, most importantly parent companies or subsidiaries, which
the exchange might be tempted to favor over other entities. By nature, the
incentive for the stock exchange's management to under-regulate such
affiliates is greater in the case of the regulation of the parent company,
because the managers are personally affected insofar as their days as
managers of the subsidiary are numbered if they fail to please the parent
company's management.
The problems that arise in this context are similar to those concerning
regulation of the stock exchange itself, and inverse to those concerning
regulation of competitors. If the affiliate is listed on the stock exchange,
both parties-the stock exchange and its affiliate-can formally enter into
listing agreements. Such a contract between "friends," however, is
probably not of much worth. The proposed solution to conflicts arising
from listing affiliates is the same as for those arising from self-listing:
mandatory dual listing for the affiliates on another market and
establishment of a separate regulatory arm that reports to the SEC.
The same is true with respect to the regulation of members and trading
(needless to say, dual listing does not help in this regard). The recent
mergers and acquisitions give a nice illustration of the problems involved.
Archipelago Holdings, the parent company of the Archipelago Exchange,
wholly owned a brokerage firm, Wave Securities. 374 This raised regulatory
concerns for two reasons: Wave Securities would have been subject to the
regulation by the regulatory arm of the Pacific Exchange, which became a
subsidiary of Archipelago last year, with the result that Wave would have
been regulated by an affiliated body. When Archipelago merged with the
New York Stock Exchange, the same problem would have happened at an
additional venue: Wave Securities would also have been subject to
regulation by the New York Stock Exchange, its direct or indirect parent
company. Both constellations would have created tensions from a
regulatory point of view. Accordingly, it is not surprising that one of the
first things announced concerning the merger was the plan to sell Wave
Securities. 375 At any rate, this might be a wise decision to avoid critiques
of the merger, regardless of whether it is also a wise business decision.
Under the proposed regulatory regime, however, such a move would not
374. For general information, see Wave Securities, http://www.wavesecurities.com (last
visited Feb. 25, 2006).
375. See Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE, Archipelago Face Hurdles On Road to Combined
Company, Wall St. J., May 2, 2005, at C3; see also Merrill to Buy Archipelago Unit, Wall
St. J., Jan. 24, 2006, at C5.
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have been necessary, for the regulatory arm of the New York Stock
Exchange would be separated anyway and report to the SEC.
G. Nonregulation (Anticompetitive Behavior)
"Congress in effecting a scheme of self-regulation designed to insure fair
dealing cannot be thought to have sanctioned and protected self-regulative
activity when carried out in a fundamentally unfair manner." 376 Thus said
the U.S. Supreme Court when dealing with anticompetitive behavior by the
New York Stock Exchange. Compare that statement with the following:
The Exchange has broad discretion regarding the listing of a company....
[T]he Exchange may deny listing or apply additional or more stringent
criteria based on any event, condition, or circumstance that makes the
listing of the company inadvisable or unwarranted in the opinion of the
Exchange. Such determination can be made even if the company meets
the standards set forth below.377
This excerpt is an official statement of the New York Stock Exchange,
made in the introduction to the New York Stock Exchange's Listed
Company Manual. The Exchange states that it has broad discretion and that
it may deny listing even if the applicant company meets the requirements of
the listing rules. 378
That creates significant problems. So far, the Article has dealt with
conflicts of interest in the regulation of stockholders, competitors, the
exchange itself, affiliates, and in general. In contrast to those cases, the
problem discussed in this section is not that the stock exchange may
unfairly regulate, but that it may, by rejecting the listing application, refuse
to regulate at all. This is not a regulatory problem but a competitive and
macroeconomic one. Let us assume Nasdaq files an application for a listing
on the New York Stock Exchange. Let us, to dramatize matters, assume
that Nasdaq together with its listing promotes new shares with the outlook
of investing in a new trading system that will poach the issuers and traders
on the New York Stock Exchange. Is the New York Stock Exchange free
of confiicts of interest when it decides on the Nasdaq Stock Market's listing
application? Can the New York Stock Exchange reject the application
without cause? Or would the competitive threat even be a reasonable
cause? Similar problems arise in regard to a delisting; the stock exchange
has broad discretion in either case.379 And finally, with the traders no
longer the owners of the marketplace, stock exchanges might use their
376. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364 (1963).
377. NYSE, Inc., supra note 34, § 101.00.
378. For the listing application procedure, see id. § 701, for the listing agreements, see id.
§ 901, and for the application forms, see id. § 903.
379. See, e.g., id. § 801.00.
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oligopoly or even monopoly powers to seek extra rents from its main
customers and former owners, the brokers and dealers. 380
These are all considerable problems that, however, must be solved by
antitrust law. 381 They are not so much regulatory problems, because the
issue is not unfair regulation but unfair denial of regulation or misuse of
economic power. Consequently, the regulatory proposal that is put forward
in the next part does not address these problems. Interestingly, the
European Union recently partly solved the problem by transferring all
listing decisions to agencies independent from the stock exchanges and
other market participants. 382
H. Other Conflicts of Interest
While the previous sections have mentioned various conflicts of interest
in the world of demutualized for-profit stock exchanges, there are many
more conflicts that could and should be addressed. So far, this Article has
been limited to stock exchanges and the listing of stock (or equity).
Exchanges, however, can list several other types of securities, such as
bonds or derivatives, with the latter being a more common example. 383 As
mentioned earlier, worldwide stock exchanges, in increasing numbers, list
derivatives or are affiliated with derivatives exchanges. Even the New
York Stock Exchange has considered trading bonds, exchange-traded funds,
and derivatives. 384 In all these cases, the conflicts related to self-listing and
regulating competitors arise in a similar manner, although generally to a
lesser extent, considering the fewer regulatory powers in this area. We have
already seen a prominent example in the United States of a case of this type:
The Pacific Exchange (part of Archipelago) trades options on Instinet,385
the alternative trading system that competes with Archipelago's stock
market (and has recently become part of Nasdaq). Aside from its influence
on the trading in these options, it is completely up to the Pacific Exchange
to determine what kind of options it offers, such as puts or calls, so that the
exchange could favor options for trading strategies that cause problems for
the trading in Instinet's equity shares.
380. For an early contribution to the widely neglected discussion, see Lee, The Future of
Securities Exchanges, supra note 4, at 21-23.
381. Antitrust cases are not unfamiliar in this field, considering the New York Stock
Exchange's monopoly power. See, e.g., Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659
(1975); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
382. Council Directive 2003/71, art. 21, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64, 79 (EC). Sentence 3 of
subsection (1) of article 21 reads as follows: "These competent authorities shall be
completely independent from all market participants." Id.
383. Bonds are usually traded on unregulated markets. See Coffee & Seligman, supra
note 21, at 15. But there is no reason why liquid bonds should not be traded on stock
exchanges, and indeed to some extent they are, particularly in Europe. As the following
remarks in the text reveal, U.S. stock markets are also about to expand their trading into the
bond market.
384. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
385. Press Release, Pac. Exch., supra note 351.
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Many other conflicts of interest may also arise if, as is likely, the stock
exchanges diversify and engage in other businesses. Such expansion has
already been identified as conflict-increasing, because it leads to more
competitors that may be unfairly treated. There is a second dimension.
Stock exchanges may use their powers over issuers and broker-dealers to
compel them to use the exchange's other services, such as clearing and
settlement. 386 Again, however, this is less a regulatory problem than an
antitrust issue, and is therefore beyond the scope of this Article. 387
Worrisome from a regulatory standpoint, however, are cases in which
stock exchanges abuse their powers over regulated entities and force them
to further the stock exchange's policy interests. The recent conflict about
the new National Market System nicely illustrates the concern. The New
York Stock Exchange through mass emails contacted the listed issuers to
ask them to support the New York Stock Exchange's position.388
IV. AMENDMENTS TO THE REGULATORY REGIME
Demutualization and subsequent listing of stock exchanges requires our
greatest attention. The progress alone does not, however, require greater
changes to the regulatory system, as the challenges that come with the new
organizational structure of stock exchanges are manageable. (Whether an
overhaul of the traditional system might be advisable for other reasons is
out of this Article's scope.)
This Article puts forward a simple proposal that seems sufficient to
address the emerging problems without overly hindering stock exchanges or
throwing overboard the traditional regulatory system: First, the regulatory
arm of the stock exchanges should be separated from the other business
units. Second, this separated regulatory arm should not report to the board
of directors of the stock exchange, but rather to the SEC. Third, self-listed
stock exchanges and their affiliates should be required to have a second
listing at another stock exchange.
The argument commences with introductory remarks on the desirability
and extent of regulation, 389 then introduces the proposed regulatory
386. See generally Group of Thirty, Global Clearing and Settlement: A Plan of Action
(2003).
387. Such anticompetitive behavior, however, is not so unlikely. For instance, the New
York Stock Exchange forbade their members to trade at other marketplaces entirely until
1975, and to a lesser degree until 2000. See NYSE, Inc., Rule 390 (removed and rescinded
May 5, 2000). Interestingly, then-Chairman of the SEC Arthur Levitt doubted that "such an
anticompetitive rule" could be sustained when the New York Stock Exchange demutualizes.
See Levitt, supra note 84, at 10; see also The Changing Face of Capital Markets and the
Impact of ECN's, supra note 84.
388. See Aaron Lucchetti, Big Board Still Carries a Big Stick, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 2005, at
Cl.
389. See infra Part IV.A.
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regime,390 and finally discusses why this proposal is superior to other
approaches. 391
A. Introductory Remarks
Any proposal of a regulatory framework for demutualized and publicly
traded stock exchanges touches upon the general question of how much
regulation of stock exchanges is desirable. The chief regulatory officer of
the New York Stock Exchange perhaps captured best what we must be able
to expect: "If self-regulation is going to work, it must show that our
decisions are irrelevant to whether it helps or hurts the [New York Stock
Exchange] as a business. '392
The offered proposal aims at nothing more than mitigating the conflicts
of interest so that the impartiality of stock exchanges remains above doubt,
without overly hindering the management of the stock exchanges.
Demutualization and subsequent public listing are critical to help stock
exchanges compete with other marketplaces, but overly regulating publicly
traded stock exchanges, which would be the result of some institutions' and
commentators' proposals, would erase the intended positive effects, cause
the entire restructuring to be questioned, and cement the U.S. stock
exchange's passive role in the worldwide consolidation, a result that by no
means would be good policy. Therefore, when discussing the new
regulatory environment for demutualized for-profit exchanges, we should
be careful with regard to the regulatory intensity that we want to employ.
In a general remark in favor of deregulation, Alan Greenspan, until
recently the chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, said some forty years ago in one of his early works, "[lit is in the
self-interest of every businessman to have a reputation for honest dealings
and a quality product.... Reputation, in an unregulated economy, is thus a
major competitive tool. 393
The "quality product" that stock exchanges (the "businessman" in
Greenspan's words) offer is organizing and regulating a market for stocks.
Is selling this product like selling bread? 394 Is the incentive to sell the best
bread to the investing customers big enough to abandon or at least reduce
the regulation of stock exchanges by the SEC? Some commentators think
so 395-and not surprisingly the stock exchanges share this view. 396 They
believe, as Greenspan suggested in his early work, that the competition for
investors will constrain the stock exchange's management and let
management focus on the stock exchange's most valuable asset: integrity.
390. See infra Part IV.B.
391. See infra Part IV.C.
392. Der Hovanesian, supra note 222, at 84 (quoting Richard G. Ketchum).
393. Alan Greenspan, The Assault on Integrity, Objectivist Newsletter, Aug. 1963, at 31,
32.
394. The bread example is taken from Mahoney, supra note 33, at 1459.
395. See generally id. (significantly titled "The Exchange as Regulator").
396. World Org. of Exchs., supra note 306, at 7; see also Carson, supra note 8, at 11.
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In this belief, these commentators argue in favor of more regulatory powers
for stock exchanges and less governmental involvement. But there are also
opponents of more regulatory power on the stock exchange level. 397 One
such opposing argument is that local stock exchanges are hardly able to
regulate the market in the age of globalization, with issuers and traders
based all over the world.398  Another, also not entirely unwarranted,
concern is that stock exchanges may abuse their regulatory powers for
anticompetitive behavior.399 And finally, perhaps the strongest point, the
stock exchange's track record is not above doubt.400 For stock exchanges
that have already lost their reputation, there is no reputation at stake, a point
that is sometimes neglected.
For the purposes of this Article, however, that discussion is somewhat
outdated and therefore only briefly summarized. Contributions so far have
mainly been based on the assumption that stock exchanges are organized in
the mutual form, with many commentators not (yet) having considered that
stock exchanges may demutualize and go public. Moreover, it is beyond
the purpose of this Article to discuss whether the current system as a
whole-most importantly the concept of self-regulation-is good policy,
and if so, to what extent.40 1 Rather, the amendments put forward in this
Article go only so far as necessary to address the challenges that come with
demutualization.
Before the Article turns to these proposed amendments, it might be
advisable to recapitulate and to emphasize that the current system of mutual
stock exchanges is all but free of the conflicts associated with demutualized
exchanges (except for self-listing, which is a new conflict). 40 2 And in
addition, there are considerable conflicts of interest under the current
397. See generally Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International
Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1855 (1997); Marcel
Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities Regulation, 83 Va. L. Rev.
1509 (1997) (arguing against more power on the stock exchange level); Sam Scott Miller,
Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical Examination, 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
853 (1985) (providing an earlier example of an argument against more power on the stock
exchange level).
398. But see Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares, supra note 11, at 370, 427 (coming to the
contrary conclusion). However, if the national authorities, such as the SEC, cannot
accurately regulate in the age of globalization, as she argues, how can the stock exchanges?
Put differently, if a governmental agency-the SEC--cannot collaborate with foreign
financial market authorities, why should the private stock exchange be able to do so?
399. See, e.g., Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Silver v. N.Y.
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
400. See supra Part IlI.A.3.
401. See Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
50700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256 (Dec. 8, 2004); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Market 2000: An
Examination of Current Equity Market Developments (1994); see also Securities Industry
Association, supra note 32. For a discussion in a broader context, see Howell E. Jackson,
Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2 Theoretical
Inquiries in L. 649 (2001) (discussing the allocation of regulatory power in the area of
corporate law, securities regulation, and the regulation of financial institutions).
402. See Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,259-75.
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system that would be solved under the new structure, particularly between
the exchange and its members, and among the members themselves. 40 3
Congress knew of these conflicts of interest when it enacted the regulatory
system in 1934. They seemed inevitable but outweighed by the benefits of
vesting regulatory power with the stock exchanges. 404 Of course, we
should not be indifferent toward conflicts of interest only because they have
always existed; but with the legislative and regulatory history in mind, we
should be confident that we can handle the challenges that come with
demutualization without questioning the whole system, and without trying
to mitigate all possible conflicts.
B. Elements of the Proposed Regime
The proposed regulatory regime for publicly traded stock exchanges has
three prongs: segregation of the regulatory arm from the business
operations, 40 5 reporting to the SEC,406 and mandatory dual listing for stock
exchanges and affiliates. 40 7
1. Segregation of the Regulatory Arm
Publicly traded stock exchanges should separate their regulatory arm
from the other business units. Though details differ, there seems to be a
broad consensus for such segregation, 40 8 and there is already some
experience with such a move. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, for
instance, spun off its regulatory arm with demutualization,40 9 and the New
York Stock Exchange had taken steps in that direction as part of its
corporate governance overhaul, and again announced that it would further
separate its regulatory arm as part of the merger of Archipelago and the
subsequent going public.410
The proposed separation mitigates all incentives and conflicts that are
related to the regulatory intensity in general, the regulation of stockholders,
of competitors, of oneself, and of affiliates. It also precludes hidden cross-
403. These conflicts are nicely described by Grasso Statement, supra note 83. See
Schroeder & Smith, supra note 164.
404. See Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-50699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,132 n.69 (Dec. 8, 2004).
405. See infra Part IV.B. 1.
406. See infra Part IV.B.2.
407. See infra Part IV.B.3.
408. Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 71,141-43; Carson, supra note 8, at 17; Levitt, supra note 84.
409. See Press Release, HKEx, A Transcript of the Address by HKEx Chairman Charles
Lee at the Legislative Council's Financial Affairs Panel (July 31, 2002), available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/0207312news.htm (describing the spin off).
410. Ketchum Statement, supra note 223, at 5-6; see also Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE to Boost
Independence Of Regulatory Unit's Board, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 2006, at B3; Lucchetti et al.,
supra note 185; Press Release, NYSE & Archipelago, supra note 97.
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subsidization, which some commentators and organizations are concerned
about.411
2. Reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission
The second prong supplements the segregation of the regulatory arm:
The head of the regulatory arm should not report to senior management or
the board of directors of the stock exchange, but to the SEC.
The rationale behind this amendment is that separation itself does not
change much if the head of the regulatory arm is still responsible to the
general management of the stock exchange. Under such a system, the
regulatory arm is only one division among others. The conflicts of interest
that require the separation are hardly mitigated if the regulatory arm
continues to report to senior management. The latter, for instance, could
require the regulatory arm to meet the company's income targets, which
would make the regulatory arm focus on fines and neglect areas that create
little income, regardless of whether this is good policy from a regulatory
standpoint.
The stock exchanges themselves are aware of this problem. For instance,
as a consequence of its corporate governance problems, the New York
Stock Exchange changed its regulatory structure so that the chief regulator
now reports to a committee of independent directors instead of the
chairman 412-concededly, a significant improvement over reporting to
senior management. If one believes that independent directors are the long-
sought-after panacea for various corporate governance issues, one will
probably say that reporting to them is sufficient to ensure a proper
separation of the regulatory arm from the other business units.4 13 However,
if one believes that independent directors are to some degree dependent on
management and tend to fraternize with management, reporting to
independent directors does not adequately mitigate the conflicts of interest.
Particularly in this context, it is questionable whether independent directors
will have the necessary regulatory knowledge and understanding of the
stock exchange's daily business to qualify as contact persons for reporting
abuses of regulatory power.
It seems, therefore, worth considering a requirement that the head of the
regulatory arm report to the SEC. This reporting requirement would not
give the Commission the power to make any decisions within the stock
exchange, concerning, for instance, their hiring of additional regulatory
staff. Such decisions should be left to the stock exchange, because there is
411. IOSCO on Exchange Demutualization, supra note 7, at 13.
412. Der Hovanesian, supra note 85. The New York Stock Exchange wants to keep this
structure after its merger with Archipelago. See Press Release, NYSE & Archipelago, supra
note 97.
413. Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 71,134-38 (relying on independent directors and committees solely composed of
independent directors).
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no reason to believe, as explained in earlier sections, that the stock
exchange generally will under-regulate or overregulate. The requirement of
reporting to the SEC will ensure only that the regulatory staff has someone
impartial to whom to report single abuses of regulatory powers, particularly
overregulation of competitors and underregulation of oneself and affiliates.
The WorldCom case shows us how important it is that employees be able to
report to someone who is not part of the corrupt system.4 14
To be sure, implementing such governmental intervention requires good
reasons. The conflicts of interest that are outlined in Part III are such good
reasons. Particularly the conflicts of interest that arise in regard to the
regulation of competitors, oneself, and affiliates require a clear separation
of business interests and regulatory functions. And it might be advisable to
consider that the proposed reporting will not change much, but rather will
codify, what virtually already exists: If stock exchanges fail to perform their
regulatory functions, the SEC can step in under the current system
anyway. 415  Taking into account the numerous other powers of the
Commission, the reporting requirement is relatively modest. That is
particularly true if compared with the frequently supported proposal to
entirely outsource the regulatory functions, a proposal that will be
considered and questioned later.
3. Mandatory Dual Listing for Stock Exchanges and Affiliates
The first and the second prongs of the regulatory proposal do not entirely
address the challenges that come with self-listing. As explained above, the
problem here is that stock exchanges cannot enter into a listing agreement
with themselves, and even if we find substitutes for surveillance and
enforcement, most of the listing requirements would miss their underlying
purpose.
To overcome this problem, we should require stock exchanges, along
with their affiliates, to choose another market for a second listing (a concept
which will be referred to as mandatory dual listing hereinafter). The rule
would not apply to stock exchanges and affiliates that do not want to list the
stocks on their own market and therefore not rely on self-listing. So for
example, if the New York Stock Exchange goes public and also wants to
list its stock on its own market, under the proposal put forward it will have
to apply for listing at another stock exchange, such as Nasdaq. In the age of
globalization, dual listing at a well-organized foreign stock exchange
should also fulfill the dual listing requirement, and the SEC could make a
list of such eligible foreign exchanges (at least Frankfurt, London, and
Paris/Euronext).
414. WorldCom's business "culture" almost entirely suppressed control by employees.
See Special Investigative Comm. of the Bd. of Dirs. of WorldCom, Inc., Report of
Investigation 18-24 (2003).
415. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2000); see id. § 21(f),15
U.S.C. § 78u(f).
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At first blush, one could counterargue that listing at competing
marketplaces is not better than self-listing. To be sure, the second stock
exchange faces conflicts of interest when it regulates competitors,
particularly if the second stock exchange itself is demutualized and publicly
traded, as discussed in earlier parts.416 Such competitor-regulating stock
exchanges, however, would be subject to the first two prongs of the
proposed regulatory system: Their regulatory arm would be separated and
would report to the SEC, procedures that the Commission could require by
foreign stock exchanges if they want to qualify for dual listing.
Concededly, dual listing creates downsides for the stock exchange. First
of all, there are listing fees that the stock exchange has to pay to the second
exchange. Secondly, the listing on two exchanges might lead to market
fragmentation and reduce liquidity. However, there are also benefits of
dual listing; otherwise companies would not voluntarily dual list, as some
do. 4 17 Even without such benefits, the downsides of dual listing constitute
no basis for rejecting the proposal of mandatory dual listing. If the costs of
dual listing are too high, the stock exchange can avoid them by forgoing
self-listing and listing solely at another stock exchange-as all companies
do that are not stock exchanges. It would be just a cost-benefit analysis of
whether the costs of self-listing outweigh the benefits.
Trickier is the problem of fragmentation. It depends on the market
structure and the linkages between the stock exchanges whether dual listing
will lead to fragmentation at all. If there is evidence that dual listing of
stock exchanges indeed leads to fragmented and illiquid markets, the
proposed regime would need a slight amendment: It would be sufficient to
make dual listing mandatory, rather than dual trading. The rationale behind
that distinction is that the regulatory concerns with respect to the regulation
of the trading in the stock exchange's own stocks are mitigated by the
separation of the regulatory arm and the reporting to the SEC. Therefore,
the new regime could allow the stock exchange to be listed at another
marketplace but not actually traded there. Based on its dual listing, the
stock exchange would be subject to the other marketplace's issuer
regulation. But without trading at this marketplace, there would be no
fragmentation in the trading of the stock exchange's shares. Put simply,
mandatory listing would mean that the shares of stock exchanges are dual
listed without being dual traded.4 18
416. Bradley sees a problem of listing on a competing market insofar as it might look like
a lack of confidence of the market to list its own shares. Bradley, supra note 11, at 685, 701.
She does not raise any regulatory concerns connected to regulating competitors.
417. Investors profit from dual listing, at least insofar as it increases the competition
among stock exchanges, which might lead to better service at lower prices.
418. Interestingly, the temporary but exceedingly successful Neuer Markt of the Deutsche
B6rse rested exactly on this model: Issuers were listed on the officially regulated market
("Geregelter Markt"), but not traded. Rather, the trading took place on the Neuer Markt. See
Andreas M. Fleckner, Die Liicke im Recht des Devisenterminhandels, 57 Zeitschrift fur
Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht 168, 171 (2003).
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In conclusion, mandatory dual listing for publicly traded stock exchanges
and their affiliates is an effective, efficient, and quite simple way to ensure
that they are as thoroughly regulated as any issuer.
C. Argument for the Proposed Regime
The regulatory system that this Article puts forward amends the current
regulatory regime only to the extent that is necessary to address the
regulatory challenges that come with demutualization.
A couple of arguments lead this Article to conclude that regulation as
such will not suffer from demutualization and listing of stock exchanges, as
stock exchanges will have no strong incentive to under-regulate their
markets. Therefore, the challenges that need to be addressed are limited to
the conflicts of interest that have been identified in Part III as being
material: that stock exchanges might abuse their regulatory powers in
certain fields to promote their own business and that they might be too soft
on themselves and too hard on competitors. Naturally, such specific abuses
are harder to detect and prevent than general regulation deficits, particularly
if they offset each other, so that the overall regulatory figures like
personnel, actions, and fines remain unchanged. But these problems are
manageable without overhauling the traditional regulatory system with
stock exchanges as frontline regulators.
Under the proposed system, market and issuer regulation would remain
in the hands of the stock exchanges. The advantages of self-regulation,
particularly the closeness and the expertise of the stock exchanges, would
not be lost. Furthermore, leaving the stock exchanges their regulatory
powers would allow them to use regulation to place themselves in the
competition. Regulation, reputation, and integrity are values that a stock
exchange can emphasize, strengthen, and promote-something for which
stock exchanges can compete, upon which they can build a brand name.
Richard Grasso, the former chairman of the New York Stock Exchange,
once said, "The money we spend on regulatory oversight ... builds equity
in our brand ... ,,419 Such statements are found all over the world.420 A
critical part of competition would be lost if we outsourced regulation to a
single regulator or the SEC.421
Another advantage of the proposed regulatory system is that we would
not have to be worried if persons that are regulated by the stock exchange
419. Grasso Statement, supra note 83; see also Greg Ip, Grasso, Zarb Differ on Self-
Regulation of Stock Markets Once They Go Public, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1999, at C17.
420. See, e.g., Humphry, supra note 123; see also Press Release, ASX, World's Stock
Exchanges Map Out Action Plan (Oct. 5, 2000), available at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/FIBV051000.pdf.
421. Commentators have proposed partially or completely outsourcing regulation to a
new regulatory organization or the SEC. See Der Hovanesian, supra note 85 (arguing that
merging the regulatory arms of the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange would save
$100 million a year); Dombalagian, supra note 63, at 1146-53; Schroeder & Smith, supra
note 164.
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hold a significant share in the stock exchange. Without any amendments
one might be worried that the stock exchange may be unwilling to enforce
independently and effectively the broker-dealers' and issuers' obligations, if
both are the stock exchange's major stockholders. 422 Under the proposed
regime, however, there would not be such a risk because the regulatory arm
would report to the SEC and not to management. This approach is much
smoother than the arbitrary ownership restrictions that some commentators
and organizations propose, most notably the Commission. 423  Such
restrictions are nothing other than poison pills that protect a stock
exchange's management against takeovers. They are not in the interest of
the stock exchange and its stockholders, because they will increase its
capital costs. And they are not in the interest of the economy, because they
may prevent efficient ownership structures. 424
The smartest move seems to be the mandatory dual listing (which does
not necessarily require dual trading). That would be much less onerous
than the reporting requirements that the SEC has proposed and those
Nasdaq has implemented, 425 and it would allow much more flexibility than
generally preventing exchanges from listing their shares on their own
market. Under the proposed regime, it will be the market that decides
whether there is enough trust to trade the shares at the exchange's own
market or, if there is reason to question the exchange's impartiality, to trade
somewhere else.
CONCLUSION
More than forty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held in the widely
recognized Silver case,
It requires but little appreciation of the extent of the Exchange's economic
power and of what happened in this country during the 1920's and 1930's
to realize how essential it is that the highest ethical standards prevail as to
every aspect of the Exchange's activities. What is basically at issue here
is whether the type of partnership between government and private
enterprise that marks the design of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
422. See supra Part III.C.
423. See Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-50699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,143-46 (Dec. 8, 2004); see
also Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50700, 69
Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,264 n.130 (Dec. 8, 2004) (referring to several marketplaces in the
United States where the SEC has allowed rules that limit ownership).
424. Possible antitrust issues, again, are not to be solved by securities law.
425. See NASD, Manual, Rule 4370 (2006) available at
http://nasd.complinet.comrnasd/display/index.html. Rule 4370, titled "Additional
Requirements for Nasdaq-Listed Securities Issued by Nasdaq or its Affiliates," most
importantly requires Nasdaq to file a monthly report with the SEC and to engage an
independent accounting firm every year to review and prepare a report. Id. For the SEC's
proposed rules, see Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-51123, 70 Fed. Reg. 6743 (Feb. 8, 2005).
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can operate effectively to insure the maintenance of such standards in the
long run.4 26
Demutualization and subsequent public listing once again challenge the
partnership to which the Court refers, known as the concept of self-
regulation.
With the proposals made in this Article, the regulatory challenges that
come with demutualization, listing, and self-listing of stock exchanges are
manageable without jeopardizing the benefits of this process. The modest
amendments put forward here would help preserve the stock exchanges'
integrity without overly hindering their management in responding to
increasing competition. Congress and the SEC would be well advised to
not go further. At the cusp of a new era, adhering to regulatory restraint is a
wise decision.
There is much at stake. While marketplaces abroad went through
demutualization a couple of years ago and have since benefited from that
transformation, U.S. stock exchanges were forced to watch the global
development from afar. Still organized in the mutual form, they played no
role in the global consolidation, for most of them were neither acquirable
nor had the money to acquire others. Nothing less was-and probably still
is-in danger, than the long U.S. predominance in the stock markets. Its
lead in futures trading has already been lost, and competition does not halt
at the derivatives markets.427 As an example, at the apex of the internet
boom, markets for start-up companies such as the German Neuer Markt
were able to win over U.S. issuers from the "new economy" that normally
would have gone public on the Nasdaq Stock Market.
Arthur Levitt, then-chairman of the SEC, as early as 1999 pointed out
that the United States could fall behind overseas markets if it missed the
trend toward demutualization and going public.428 Mr. Levitt aptly noted
that "today's global marketplace always stands ready to offer alternatives
that are more responsive to investor needs. '429 Mr. Levitt, in dramatic
fashion, warned that if the people at the New York Stock Exchange did not
change "their method of governance, they won't be here five years from
now."430  At the same time, observers described the New York Stock
426. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963).
427. The leading derivatives exchange is now Eurex, which is jointly owned and operated
by Deutsche Birse and the SWX Swiss Exchange. Most importantly, no other exchange
trades more contracts: On Eurex, 1.014 billion contracts were traded in 2003. See The
Handbook of World Stock, Derivative & Commodity Exchanges 37 (Herbie Skeete ed.,
2004). None of the various U.S. derivatives exchanges reaches this volume: 640.2 million
at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, id. at 744, 454.2 million at the Chicago Board of Trade,
id. at 728, 283.9 million at the Chicago Board Options Exchange, id. at 701, 244.9 million at
the International Securities Exchange, id. at 780, and 180.1 million at the American Stock
Exchange, id. at 685.
428. See Levitt, supra note 84.
429. The Changing Face of Capital Markets and the Impact of ECN's, supra note 84.
430. Sugawara, NYSE Must Change, supra note 82 (quoting Arthur Levitt).
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Exchange as being led by "die-hard traditionalists" '431 and as a "potential
Titanic."432
That was more than six years ago. Not much has changed since, until
recently. The Wall Street Journal, disinclined to defame a U.S. icon
without reason, still in 2005 characterized the New York Stock Exchange as
a "rinky-dink" company, 433 a "dinosaur," 434 an "anachronism," 435 and the
"queen of slow markets." 436
It is probably not too late to catch up with global competition-but it will
require prompt action to defend the long-enjoyed U.S. preeminence in stock
trading. Recent mergers are an important step, but it is only the very first.
431. Humphry, supra note 80.
432. A Home-Grown Revolutionary, supra note 81.
433. Holman W. Jenkins, Antique for Sale, Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 2005, at A15.
434. Murray, supra note 144; see also Donaldson's Dinosaur, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 2005, at
A14.
435. Murray, supra note 144.
436. SEC Loves NYSE, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 2004, at A14.
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